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Treaty Abuse in the Post-BEPS World: Analysis 
of the Policy Shift and Impact of the Principal 
Purpose Test for MNE Groups
In this article, the author discusses treaty abuse 
in the Post-BEPS world and focuses on the 
practical impact of the Principal Purpose Test 
(PPT rule) for MNE groups. The article analyses 
in particular the meaning of substance under 
the PPT rule and the consequences of denial of 
treaty benefits. 
1.  Introduction
7 June 2017 marked a turning point in the area of inter-
national taxation with the signing of the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures 
to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“MLI”). The 
signing ceremony brought together 68 jurisdictions that 
agreed to introduce the tax treaty measures of the OECD/
G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative 
into their international tax policies. It is recognized that 
tax treaty abuse, which primarily affects source states, 
represents one of the most important BEPS concerns.1 
Accordingly, the outcome of OECD’s BEPS Final Report 
on Action 6 (“BEPS Action 6”), which has been transposed 
into part III of the MLI, is probably the item of the instru-
ment that will have the most significant practical impact 
in future years. 
After brief ly reviewing the policy of tackling treaty 
abuse in the pre-BEPS era (see section 2.) and outlining 
the treaty measures provided under the MLI (see section 
3.), the author focuses on the Principal Purpose Test 
(PPT rule) which serves as a minimum standard under 
the MLI and will be introduced in more than 1,100 tax 
treaties.2 The author shows that states may not give to the 
PPT rule an interpretation that exceeds its OECD Com-
mentaries, which, in the author’s view, represents binding 
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analysis, 46 Intertax 1 (forthcoming 2018).
context under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties (“VCLT”). Accordingly, he argues that the PPT rule 
should in essence be construed as a business reality test 
that applies to both abusive restructurings and conduit 
situations. As indicated by the OECD Commentaries, one 
of the key elements in deciding whether treaty benefits 
ought to be granted is whether an arrangement is “inex-
tricably linked to a core commercial activity”.3  The anal-
ysis thus focuses very much on substance, and transfer 
pricing principles may here be relied upon as guidance. 
That is, if the entity in the residence state exercises (respec-
tively bears) the relevant functions and risks, it should be 
assumed that the arrangement is indeed linked to a core 
commercial activity.
Moreover, he shows that, when the PPT rule is applica-
ble, a jurisdiction is not prevented from granting treaty 
benefits on the basis of a recharacterized fact pattern (for 
example, treaty benefits available before a restructuring) 
even if such jurisdiction has not opted for the discretion-
ary relief mechanism provided by article 7(4) of the MLI. 
Furthermore, the author finds that, despite the use of the 
phrase “[n]otwithstanding any provisions of a Covered 
Tax Agreement”, the PPT rule may only come into play to 
the extent that the relevant factual situation is not covered 
by a specific treaty anti-avoidance rule (SAAR).
Finally, it is remarkable that BEPS Action 6 addresses 
conduit structures exclusively on the basis of the PPT 
rule (or an anti-conduit mechanism producing similar 
results) and makes no reference to the beneficial owner-
ship concept in articles 10 to 12 of the 2014 OECD Model. 
In the author’s opinion, this is yet another confirmation 
that beneficial ownership is not an appropriate test to deal 
with conduit situations and should be construed restric-
tively pursuant to the 2014 OECD Commentaries. For 
this reason, he argues that states currently favouring a 
broad substance-oriented meaning of beneficial owner-
ship coupled with the lack of a purpose test analysis should 
revisit this position. That is, the meaning of beneficial 
ownership should be aligned with its restrictive interpre-
tation under the 2014 OECD Commentaries, and possi-
ble conduit situations should be examined pursuant to the 
PPT rule. This is because a broad and objective interpre-
tation of beneficial ownership, which does not take into 
3. OECD/G20, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropri-
ate Circumstances – Action 6: Final Report  (OECD/G20 2015), Inter-
national Organizations’ Documentation IBFD [hereinafter: Action 6 
Final Report]; OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital:
Commentary on Article 29 para. 181 (21 Nov. 2017), Models IBFD.
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consideration the intention of the taxpayer and focuses 
primarily on the criterion of economic interdependence, 
does not fully coincide with the analysis under the PPT 
rule. The PPT rule will indeed not simply apply because 
there is some sort of factual connection between the 
income received and the item paid to another person, but 
rather because the purpose of the transaction is abusive. 
Hence, as shown by the 2017 updated OECD Commentar-
ies, the PPT rule will not apply where, despite the existence 
of such factual connection, the transaction is conforming 
to the standard commercial organization and behaviour 
of the group.
From a policy perspective, it is however unfortunate that 
the PPT rule has been drafted in such broad terms as its 
meaning becomes potentially very far-reaching as soon as 
it is detached from the 2017 updated OECD Commentar-
ies. This may indeed lead to uncertainties and increased 
tax treaty disputes around the globe. Therefore, multina-
tional enterprises will be well advised to ensure in advance 
and especially in the initial implementation phase that 
the scope that will be given to the PPT rule by the juris-
dictions in which they operate coincides with the OECD 
interpretation.
2.  review of Selected Tax Treaty Anti-Avoidance
rules in the Pre-MlI World
2.1.  Introductory remarks
Prior to moving to the responses of the MLI to treaty abuse, 
the author finds it appropriate to first review selected 
treaty anti-avoidance rules of the pre-BEPS era, notably 
the beneficial ownership requirement and the OECD 
guiding principle introduced in the 2003 OECD Com-
mentaries. It would of course be beyond the scope of this 
article and unnecessary to discuss these well-known tests 
at length. However, a brief overview appears useful for at 
least three reasons. First of all, these rules will remain in 
place after the entry into force of the measures introduced 
by the MLI (in particular, the PPT rule). Accordingly, the 
question of the delineation of their respective scope will 
arise. Second, a presentation of the guiding principle is 
necessary since, according to the OECD, the PPT rule 
would merely represent a codification of this principle. 
Finally, once an anti-avoidance rule is found to be appli-
cable, one issue that must be determined in practice is the 
consequences produced by the denial of treaty benefits.
2.2.  Beneficial ownership as the initial response: 
Problems and limits
2.2.1.  Conflicting case law decisions 
2.2.1.1.  Introductory remarks
It is fair to say that the beneficial ownership requirement, 
which was introduced in 1977 into the dividends,4 inter-
est5 and royalties6 articles, is seen by many states as the 
4. OECD Income and Capital Model Convention art. 10(2) (11 Apr. 1977),
Models IBFD [hereinafter: OECD Model (1977)].
5. Id., at art. 11(2).
6. Id., at art. 12(1).
initial response to treaty abuse. It is, of course, contro-
versial whether beneficial ownership was initially intro-
duced in the OECD Model for this purpose and, respec-
tively, whether this requirement is really a genuine SAAR 
or merely a condition of application of these distributive 
rules. The fact remains, however, that the tax treaty prac-
tice of several countries – particularly those jurisdictions 
which construe beneficial ownership in a broad economic 
fashion7 – relies on beneficial ownership to tackle treaty 
shopping situations. As will be shown in the following 
sections of this article, a broad economic interpretation 
of beneficial ownership does not necessarily equate the 
policy of BEPS Action 6, particularly when such policy is 
not combined with a principal purpose test. 
The predominant view is that beneficial ownership should 
have an autonomous8 and international fiscal meaning 
as noted, in particular, in the famous Indofood case;9 
the content of this meaning remains, however, heavily 
debated and controversial,10 with, in essence, some juris-
dictions adopting a rather formal and legal interpreta-
tion (see section 2.2.1.2.) and others favouring by con-
trast a broader substance-over-form approach (see section 
2.2.1.3.).11
2.2.1.2.  Formal interpretation 
An illustrative example of the formal interpretation of 
beneficial ownership is, of course, Canadian case law. In 
Prévost,12 in particular, the Tax Court ruled in favour of 
the taxpayer and held that a Dutch company owned by 
Swedish and UK shareholders was the beneficial owner of 
Canadian-source dividends despite an obligation to dis-
tribute its profits to its shareholders pursuant to a share-
holders’ agreement. The court considered, inter alia, that 
the agreement did not impose any legal obligation on 
the Dutch entity.13 Similarly, in Velcro,14 beneficial own-
ership was upheld even though a company established 
7. See sec. 2.2.1.3.
8. This is the case where the context of art. 3(2) of the OECD Model
requires a different interpretation. In this respect, see, among others,
R. Danon, Le concept de bénéficiaire effectif dans le cadre du MC OCDE:
réf lexions et analyse de la jurisprudence récente, IFF Forum für Steuer-
recht 2007 1, 38 et seq.
9. Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, London
branch, 2006, EWCA Civ 158.
10. For a recent general scholarly contribution on the topic, see, in partic-
ular, A. Meindl-Ringler, Beneficial Ownership in International Tax Law 
(Wolters Kluwer 2016), and B. Baumgartner, Das Konzept des beneficial 
owner im internationalen Steuerrecht der Schweiz (Schulthess 2010).
11. For recent reviews of national case law, see, in particular, Meindl -
Ringler, supra n. 10, at 95 et seq.; R. Danon & Dinh, La clause du bénéfici-
aire effectif, in Modèle de Convention fiscale OCDE concernant le revenue 
et la fortune (Commentaire 2014) para. 121 et seq. (R. Danon et al. eds.) 
with regard to art. 1; and E. Kemmeren, Preface to Articles 10 to 12, in 
Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation
Conventions N 51 et seq. (4th ed., Kluwer Law International 2015).
12. CA: TCC, 22 Apr. 2008, 231, Prévost Car Inc. v. the Queen, Tax Treaty
Case Law IBFD.
13. Id., para. 103.
14. In this respect, see, among others, B. Arnold, The Concept of Benefi-
cial Ownership under Canadian Tax Treaties, in Beneficial Ownership: 
Recent Trends 41 et seq. (M. Lang et al. eds, IBFD 2013), Online Books
IBFD; A. Cockfield, Tax Treaty Disputes in Canada, in A Global Anal-
ysis of Tax Treaty Disputes, 146 et seq. (E. Baistrocchi ed, Cambridge 
University Press 2017); Danon & Dinh, supra n. 11, at para. 138 et seq. 
with regard to art. 1; and Meindl-Ringler, supra n. 10, at 225 et seq.
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in the Netherlands was under the obligation to transfer 
approximately 90% of the royalties received to a company 
based in the Netherlands Antilles. The court focused in 
particular on the fact that the royalties were commingled 
with other funds of the Dutch entity.15  In the Netherlands, 
the Royal Dutch Oil Company (“market maker case”) may 
also be regarded as a restrictive interpretation of bene-
ficial ownership.16 In this case, a UK resident stockbro-
ker company, which had bought dividend coupons after 
the dividend had been declared but before it had been 
made payable, was considered the beneficial owner of this 
income.17 Canadian18 and Dutch scholars19 recognize that 
these decisions establish a very low threshold for bene-
ficial ownership that merely excludes agents, nominees 
and conduit companies with absolutely no discretion 
over the amounts received or compelled, on the basis of 
a legal obligation (and not merely factual circumstances), 
from transferring the income received to a non-resident. 
This interpretation is similar to that conveyed by the 2014 
OECD Commentaries. This being said, a fact pattern such 
as the one submitted to the court in the market maker 
case also raises the question of the delineation between 
conduit situations on the one hand and abusive restruc-
turings (i.e. the fact of assigning a right to a resident with a 
view to obtaining treaty benefits) on the other. While ben-
eficial ownership is capable of addressing (some) conduit 
situations, it is by contrast quite clear that it does not cover 
situations in which treaty abuse is exclusively rooted in a 
last-minute restructuring. In fact, as will be seen in the fol-
lowing sections, in dealing with this fact pattern, the 2017 
Commentaries to the PPT rule do not classify this situ-
ation as a conduit but rather as an abusive restructuring. 
2.2.1.3.  Substance-oriented interpretation 
In other jurisdictions, beneficial ownership is by constrast 
construed on the basis of a substance-over-form analysis. 
In Switzerland, at least since the Total Return Swap Case, 
which was decided in 201520 and recently confirmed on 
numerous occasions,21 this interpretation is clearly fol-
lowed. In essence, Swiss case law defines beneficial own-
15. CA: TCC 2 Apr. 2012, 57, Velcro Canada Inc v. the Queen, Tax Treaty 
Case Law IBFD. Para. 45 reads as follows: “[T]here was no pre-deter-
mined f low of funds. What there is is a contractual obligation by VHBV 
to pay to VIBV a certain amount of monies within a specified time
frame. These monies are not necessarily identified as specific monies, 
they may be identified as a percentage of a certain amount received by
VHBV from VCI, but there is no automated f low of specific monies
because of the discretion of VHBV with respect to the use of these
monies”.
16. NL: Hoge Raad (Supreme Court, HR), 6 Apr. 1994, no. 28 638 (com-
monly known as the “market maker case”), BNB 1994/217 and Tax
Treaty Case Law IBFD.
17. Id.
18. Arnold, supra n. 14, at 49.
19. D.S. Smit, in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends 88 (M. Lang et al. eds.,
IBFD 2013).
20. CH: Federal Tribunal (FT), 5 May 2015, ATF 141 II 447; for a recent dis-
cussion of this case at an international level, see, in particular, R. Danon, 
Tax Treaty Disputes in Switzerland, in A Global Analysis of Tax Treaty 
Disputes 654 et seq. (E. Baistrocchi ed., 2017) O. Weidmann, Swiss Swaps 
case, 44 Intertax 8-9, 621 et seq. (2016).
21. CH: FT, 5 May 2015, 2C_895/2012 (SMI Index future); CH: FT, 2
Oct. 2015, 2C_383/2013 (single stock futures); CH: FT 22 Nov. 2015, 
2C_752/2014 (preferred equity certificates); see also CH: FT, 5 Apr. 2017,
2C_964/2016.
ership by reference to economic control and focuses on 
the criterion of interdependence between income and 
the obligation to transfer such income to non-residents 
on the basis of a legal arrangement or, more importantly 
in practice, simply factual circumstances.22 The Federal 
Tribunal generally considers that economic control over 
the income received fails to exist where, on the basis of 
a legal or factual obligation, all or even just an essential 
portion of such income is being transferred to non-res-
idents.23 Moreover, Swiss case law draws a clear distinc-
tion between beneficial ownership and the general pro-
hibition of abuse, which includes both an objective and 
a subjective element.24 Accordingly, beneficial owner-
ship ought to be construed in an objective manner and, 
therefore, does not incorporate any subjective element.25 
It consequently follows that the intention and motives 
that have led the taxpayer to select a particular arrange-
ment or structure are irrelevant. In the same vein, the 
fact that a transfer of shares to a resident of a contracting 
state does not lead to a more favourable residual treaty 
rate than that initially applicable in the state of source was 
recently found to be irrelevant for the purpose of the ben-
eficial ownership analysis.26 In some decisions, however, 
a purpose-oriented analysis has been conducted against 
the taxpayer to confirm the absence of beneficial owner-
ship.27 This case law may thus lead to uncertainties where 
an economic interdependence exists between the funds 
but the arrangement nevertheless pursues a valid busi-
ness purpose. As will be seen, from this perspective, Swiss 
case law is conceptually not in line with the policy of BEPS 
Action 6, which tackles conduit situations with a prin-
cipal purpose test. In France, by contrast, the connec-
tion between beneficial ownership and the reservation of 
abuse (fraude à la loi) has been clearly established in the 
Bank of Scotland case.28 The case concerned the sale by a 
US corporation to a UK bank, for a three-year period, of 
the usufruct of non-voting preferred shares issued by its 
wholly-owned French subsidiary. The UK bank acquired 
the usufruct by way of a one-off payment. The acquisition 
allowed the UK bank to receive in the three-year period 
a dividend whose amount was predetermined and guar-
anteed by the US corporation.29 The Conseil d’État ruled 
that the UK bank was not the beneficial owner because, 
22. Id.
23. Swap Case, supra n. 20, para. 5.2.4.
24. See, for example, CH: Federal Administrative Tribunal (FAT), 26 Aug.
2016, A-2902/2014, para. 4.3.3 (partially confirmed by FT judgment of 
5 Apr. 2017, supra n. 21; Weidmann, supra n. 20, para. 4.5.
25. Id.
26. CH: FAT, 20 Dec. 2016, A-1426/2011, 5.3.2.3.
27. For example, in a case decided in 2014, the FAT held that, where the 
interposition of an entity in the state of residence is regarded as abusive,
there is a presumption that such entity may not be regarded as the bene-
ficial owner (CH: FAT, 25 June 2014, A-4693/2013 (partially confirmed 
by CH: FT, 3 Dec. 2015, 2C_753/2014) and A-4689/2013 (partially con-
firmed by CH: FT, 27 Nov. 2015, 2C_752/2014), para. 8.4.). In a recent 
judgment, the FAT even referred to a purpose alien to treaty benefits, 
namely the objective to benefit from a favourable regime in Luxem-
bourg (FAT judgment of 20 Dec. 2016, supra n. 26, at para. 5.2.2.3).
28. FR: Conseil d’État (CE), 29 Dec. 2006, No. 28314; see, among others, B. 
Gibert & Y. Ouamrane, Beneficial Ownership – A French Perspective, 48 
Eur. Taxn. 1, 2 et seq. (2008); D. Gutmann, in M. Lang et al. (eds.), supra 
n. 14, at 167 et seq.; Danon & Dinh, supra n. 11, at para. 134 et seq. with
regard to art. 1; Meindl-Ringler, supra n. 10, at 235 et seq.
29. Gibert & Ouamrane, supra, at 7.
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in essence, (i) the sale of the usufruct was a disguised loan 
made by the UK bank to the US corporation, with the 
French subsidiary reimbursing the loan to the UK bank 
for its parent company through the payment of divi-
dends; and, applying the reservation of abuse in the anal-
ysis, (ii) the temporary cession of the usufruct in respect 
of non-voting preferred shares was an arrangement made 
with the only intention of obtaining treaty benefits.30 
As was observed in relation to the market maker case,31 
however, it is controversial whether this second element 
falls within the scope of beneficial ownership, even when 
construed broadly. Similarly, in Spain, in the Real Madrid 
cases,32 the notion of abuse was also relied upon to justify 
a broad meaning of beneficial ownership. In the United 
Kingdom, the broad meaning given to beneficial owner-
ship in the Indofood decision33 also gave rise to uncer-
tainties, for example in the field of capital market trans-
actions involving SPVs.34 In its guidance, HM Revenue & 
Customs thus referred to the notion of abuse, but rather in 
order to carve out the application of beneficial ownership 
in bona fide situations: “Where there is no abuse … there 
is no need, in practice, to apply the international fiscal 
meaning of beneficial ownership”.35 Based in particular 
on the Bank of Scotland decision, some commentators, 
in the same vein, have argued that an intentional element 
should form part of the beneficial ownership analysis.36 
While desirable from a policy perspective, however, this 
approach is unatisfactory because building a purpose 
test into beneficial ownership is at odds with its literal 
wording. By contrast, as will be seen, this shortcoming 
may be overcome by the PPT rule, provided, of course, 
that it is correctly construed. 
It is not the purpose of this article to revisit the case law 
on beneficial ownership around the globe,37 but simply to 
emphasize again the different meaning given to the term 
across jurisdictions, despite the evolution of the OECD 
Commentaries, upon which the author will now focus. 
2.2.2.  Evolution of the OECD commentaries 
2.2.2.1.  Uncertainties raised by the 1977 and 2003 
Commentaries 
When it was introduced into the OECD Model in 1977, 
beneficial ownership was essentially meant to deny treaty 
30. Id.
31. Case no. 28 638, supra n. 16.
32. See A.M. Jiménez, in M. Lang et al. (eds.), supra n. 14, at 127 et seq.
33. See supra n. 9.
34. INTM332060, N 2; P. Baker, United Kingdom: Indofood International 
Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, in M. Lang et al. (eds.), supra 
n. 14, at 27 et seq.
35. INTM332060, N 2.
36. See, in particular, Gutmann, supra n. 28, at 171-172, militating in favour
of including an intentional element into beneficial ownership.
37. The meaning of beneficial ownership is currently capturing attention at
EU level further to several pending Danish cases before the ECJ raising 
the question of the meaning of beneficial ownership under EU direct 
tax directives and the relationship of this meaning with that under
the OECD Commentaries. On beneficial ownership of interest, see 
C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16, C-299/16 and C-682/16, and on benefi-
cial ownership of dividends, see C-116/16 and C-117/16.
benefits to agents and nominees.38 However, the Double 
Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Compa-
nies report published by the OECD in 198639 resulted in 
amendments to the 2003 Commentaries to articles 10, 11 
and 12 clarifying that:
[a] conduit company cannot normally be regarded as the ben-
eficial owner if, though the formal owner, it has, as a practical
matter, very narrow powers which render it, in relation to the
income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on 
account of the interested parties.40 
The 2003 update to the OECD Commentaries then added 
confusion to the meaning of beneficial ownership by 
stating that the term should not be:
used in a narrow technical sense, rather, it should be understood 
in its context and in light of the object and purposes of the Con-
vention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion and avoidance.41 
2.2.2.2.  Narrowing of beneficial ownership in the 2014 
Commentaries 
The 2014 Commentaries may be regarded as lowering, 
once again, the threshold of beneficial ownership42 and 
bringing the expression close to its original meaning. This 
intention is suggested by a number of passages of the 2014 
Commentaries, as well as by the context in which they 
were adopted. First of all, the 2014 OECD Commentar-
ies state that:
[t]he term “beneficial owner” is intended to address difficulties 
arising from the use of the words “paid to” in relation to divi-
dends rather than difficulties related to the ownership of the
shares of the company paying these dividends.43 
Second, the denial of the quality of beneficial owner to 
the recipient on the ground that the income is being for-
warded seems to be limited to cases in which such income, 
based on legal documents or facts and circumstances, is 
“constrained by a contractual or legal obligation” to pass 
on the payment received to another person.44 This defini-
tion embodies a subtle but important difference if com-
pared with a pure substance-over-form approach of ben-
eficial ownership such as that which is currently favoured 
under Swiss case law. That is, under this case law, the exis-
tence of an obligation to transfer the income received may 
stem from a legal arrangement or simply from the facts. 
38. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary 
on Articles 10 para. 12 (28 Jan. 2003), Models IBFD; OECD Model: Com-
mentary on Article 12 para. 4 (1977).
39. See OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Com-
panies, adopted by the OECD Council on 27 Nov. 1986, N 14.
40. OECD, 2002 Reports Related to the OECD Model Tax Convention, Part 
I. Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits, 27 (OECD, May 2003) 
[hereinafter: OECD Model 2002 Reports]; OECD Model Commentary on
Article 10 para. 12.1 (2003); Id., Commentary on Article 11 para. 8.1; Id., 
Commentary on Article 12 para. 4.1.
41. OECD Model 2002 Reports, supra, at 26; OECD Model: Commentary
on Article 10 para. 12 (2003); Id., Commentary on Article 11 para. 8; Id.,
Commentary on Article 12 para. 4.
42. Danon & Dinh, supra n. 11, at para. 142 with regard to art. 1. In the
same vein, among others, A. Wardzynski, The 2014 Update to the OECD 
Commentary: A Targeted Hybrid Approach to Beneficial Ownership,
43 Intertax 2, 190 (2015).
43. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary
on Article 10 para. 2 (26 July 2014), Models IBFD.
44. Id.
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Under the 2014 Commentaries, by contrast, the facts may 
only serve as a tool to prove the existence of a legal or con-
tractual obligation.45 Accordingly, if the recipient of the 
income “does have the right to use and enjoy the dividend 
unconstrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass 
on the payment received to another person the recipient is 
the ‘beneficial owner’”.46 Moreover, the 2014 OECD Com-
mentaries state that:
this type of obligation would not include contractual or legal 
obligations that are not dependent on the receipt of the payment 
by the direct recipient such as an obligation that is not depen-
dent on the receipt of the payment and which the direct recipient 
has as a debtor or as a party to financial transactions, or typical 
distribution obligations of pension schemes and of collective 
investment vehicles…47 
and further, that:
whilst the concept of “beneficial owner” deals with some forms 
of tax avoidance (i.e. those involving the interposition of a recip-
ient who is obliged to pass on the dividend to someone else), it 
does not deal with other cases of treaty shopping and must not, 
therefore, be considered as restricting in any way the application 
of other approaches to addressing such cases.48 
Finally, the idea that the threshold of the beneficial own-
ership requirement has been reduced also f lows from the 
context surrounding the foregoing amendments. Indeed, 
in the field of arrangements involving financial institu-
tions, in particular, it was found that a definition of ben-
eficial ownership that is overly broad could have unin-
tended effects on certain transactions pursuing legitimate 
purposes.49 
While the foregoing statement may be interpreted to mean 
that beneficial ownership is a test that is only capable 
of addressing conduit situations as opposed to abusive 
restructurings, the foregoing passage may also be con-
strued to suggest that, as it is put into effect by the 2014 
OECD Commentaries, beneficial ownership is of very 
limited use in conduit situations. 
2.2.3.  Confirmation of the 2014 policy by BEPS Action 6
In the author’s view, some support for this latter interpre-
tation may be found in BEPS Action 6. First of all, in rela-
tion to article 29 of the 2017 update to the OECD Model, 
the new Commentaries state that the PPT rule covers:
limitations on the taxing rights of a Contracting State in respect 
of dividends, interest or royalties arising in that State, and paid 
to a resident of the other State (who is the beneficial owner) 
under Article 10, 11 or 12.50 
The new Commentaries to articles 10, 11 and 12 also 
mirror this policy:
The provisions of article 29 and the principles put forward … 
will apply to prevent abuses, including treaty shopping situ-
45. In the same vein, Kemmeren, supra n. 11; Weidmann, supra n. 20, at 231.
46. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 10 para. 12.4 (2014).
47. Id., at para. 2.
48. Id.
49. See Danon, supra n. 20, at 656.
50. Action 6 Final Report, at 65-66; 2017 Update to OECD Model Tax Con-
vention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 29 para. 175 
(21 Nov. 2017).
ations where the recipient is the beneficial owner of the divi-
dends.51 
These passages thus confirm that the PPT rule would 
apply in a situation in which beneficial ownership is 
upheld, which could be read to suggest that beneficial 
ownership does not cover all conduit cases as it is to be 
construed restrictively in accordance with the 2014 OECD 
Commentaries. Second, in accordance with BEPS Action 
6, the MLI and the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries 
provide, as will be discussed, that states wishing to opt 
out of including the PPT rule in order to favour an LOB 
clause are to supplement such clause with specific rules to 
address conduit structures. BEPS Action 6 and the 2017 
updated OECD Commentaries stipulate that:
[t]hese rules would deal with such conduit arrangements by
denying the benefits of the provisions of the Convention, or of
some of them (e.g. those of Articles 7, 10, 11, 12 and 21), in respect 
of any income obtained under, or as part of, a conduit arrange-
ment. They could also take the form of domestic anti-abuse rules 
or judicial doctrines that would achieve a similar result.52 
The new Commentaries also contain a number of exam-
ples53 highlighting the function and scope of such rules. 
These examples are also applicable to the PPT rule. Illus-
trative in this respect is example C.54 In this example, TCO 
is a company resident in state T, which does not have a tax 
treaty with state S, and loans 1,000,000 to SCO, a company 
resident in state S that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
TCO, in exchange for a note issued by SCO. TCO later 
realizes that it can avoid the withholding tax on interest 
levied by state S by assigning the note to its wholly-owned 
subsidiary RCO, a resident of state R (the treaty between 
states R and S does not allow source taxation of interest in 
certain circumstances). Therefore, TCO assigns the note 
to RCO in exchange for a note issued by RCO to TCO. The 
note issued by SCO bears interest at 7% and the note issued 
by RCO bears interest at 6%. The 2017 updated OECD 
Commentaries note that:
[t]he transaction through which RCO acquired the note issued 
by SCO constitutes a conduit arrangement because it was struc-
tured to eliminate the withholding tax that TCO would other-
wise have paid to State S.55 
It is remarkable that the final report on BEPS Action 6 
does not contain any reference to the possibility of relying 
on the beneficial ownership concept in articles 10, 11 and 
12 of the OECD Model to address these conduit situations. 
In the author’s opinion, the fact that these cases fall within 
the scope of the PPT rule and, respectively, the princi-
ples dealing with conduit arrangements as regards states 
not wishing to apply the PPT rule, is a further indication 
that beneficial ownership should now be understood in 
a restrictive manner and that it is ineffective in dealing 
with most modern conduit situations.56 The structure of 
51. Id., Commentary on Article 10 para. 12.5.
52. OECD, supra n. 3, 65-66, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29 para. 
187.
53. OECD, supra n. 3, 66 and 69, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 187.
54. OECD, supra n. 3, 66-67, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29 para. 
187.
55. Id.
56. See also Action 6 Final Report, at 18.
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the 2017 OECD Model also confirms this interpretation. 
Indeed, article 29 (entitlement to benefits) is to be applied 
after the distributive rules. Accordingly, if conduit struc-
tures were caught by beneficial ownership, the need to 
resort to article 29 would not arise (systematic argument).
As will be shown, the policy of BEPS Action 6 also implies 
that even if a state, contrary to the OECD approach, 
attaches a broad substance-oriented but objective 
meaning to beneficial ownership, conduit arrangements 
must nevertheless be tackled by the PPT rule or, if an LOB 
is favoured, by distinct rules relating to conduit structures 
framed in accordance with the new OECD Commentar-
ies and achieving a similar result. This is because a broad 
but objective interpretation of beneficial ownership in 
conduit situations may not necessarily be equated to the 
PPT rule, which allows, in addition, the purpose of the 
arrangement to be taken into account.
2.2.4.  Synthesis
The outcome of BEPS Action 6 confirms that, in line 
with the 2014 OECD Commentaries, beneficial owner-
ship must be construed narrowly. That is, the term only 
excludes from the scope of treaty benefits persons acting 
as agents, nominees or, more broadly, those that are con-
strained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass on 
the payment received to another person. By contrast, 
beneficial ownership does not deal with conduit situa-
tions involving merely a factual or functional connec-
tion between the income received and the item paid out. 
The current tax treaty practice of several jurisdicitions, 
however, departs from this formal interpretation and con-
strues beneficial ownership to include those conduit sit-
uations involving a mere economic and functional con-
nection between the streams of income. Yet, the need to 
include an intentional element or purpose test in the anal-
ysis then becomes controversial as this subjective compo-
nent is at odds with the literal meaning of beneficial own-
ership. The second problem is that, even if it is construed 
broadly, beneficial ownership is not capable of dealing 
with cases in which a potential abuse stems from the mere 
assignment of rights to a resident. For these reasons, the 
evolution of tax treaty policy gradually led to an increased 
focus on general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) with, in 
particular, the insertion of a guiding principle in the 2003 
OECD Commentaries. 
2.3.  Increased focus on GAARs
2.3.1.  In general
A second approach to tackle treaty abuse is, of course, to 
rely on a GAAR, whether of a treaty or domestic nature. 
The question of whether domestic anti-avoidance mea-
sures may be reconciled with tax treaty obligations is, 
however, highly debated57 and may also be approached 
57. S. van Weeghel, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti- 
Avoidance Provisions 25 (IBFD 2010); B. Arnold & S. van Weeghel, The 
Relationship between Tax Treaties and Domestic Anti-Abuse Measures, 
in Tax Treaties and Domestic Law Vol. 2, 89 et seq. (G. Maisto ed., IBFD
2006), Online Books IBFD; L. de Broe, International Tax Planning and
Prevention of Abuse 403 et seq. (IBFD 2008).
from the perspective of treaty override.58 In 2003, the 
OECD Commentaries were amended in an attempt to 
deal with the problem. The approach taken at the time, 
which is useful to summarize brief ly hereafter, relies on 
two pillars. First, for the purpose of denying treaty ben-
efits in the case of abuse, states may alternatively choose 
to rely on their domestic anti-avoidance rules (see section 
2.3.2.1.) or on the principle of good faith enshrined in 
article 31 of the VCLT in the sense of an unwritten pro-
hibition of abuse (see section 2.3.2.2.). In other words, the 
prevention of abuse may have a domestic or treaty foun-
dation. Second and more importantly, the 2003 update 
introduces a “guiding principle” that states should observe 
when deciding to refuse treaty benefits. As will be shown, 
the nature of this guiding principle is unclear. Further-
more, it is fair to say that the 2003 update of the Com-
mentaries has not resolved but rather continued to exac-
erbate the tension between domestic anti-avoidance rules 
and treaty obligations.59 Hence, within the framework of 
BEPS Action 6, the OECD response to these tensions was 
precisely to move the guiding principle from its Commen-
taries to the OECD Model itself in the form of a PPT rule.
2.3.2.  Position of the OECD Commentaries
2.3.2.1.  Compatibility of domestic anti-avoidance rules 
with tax treaties 
The analysis of the compatibility of domestic anti-avoid-
ance rules with tax treaties would deserve a study of its own 
and is outside the scope of the present contribution. Thus, 
it may be simply observed that the 2003 OECD Commen-
taries address the compatibility of domestic anti-avoid-
ance rules (for example, rules based on “substance over 
form”, “economic substance” and other general anti-abuse 
rules) and arrives at the conclusion that these rules do not 
conflict with treaty obligations.60 In essence, this reason-
ing is based on the idea that such rules are part of the basic 
principles set by domestic tax laws for determining which 
facts give rise to a tax liability. These rules are thus not 
addressed in tax treaties and are, according to the OECD, 
therefore not affected by them.61 
This position was already controversial in 2003, so that it 
led several states to formulate observations on it, notably 
Ireland,62 Luxembourg,63 the Netherlands64 and Switzer-
land.65 Switzerland, in particular, observed that:
domestic tax rules on abuse of tax conventions must conform 
to the general provisions of tax conventions, especially where 
the convention itself includes provisions intended to prevent 
its abuse ….66 
In fact, the language used by the 2003 Commentaries sug-
gests that the position of the OECD is not really a reso-
58. C. de Pietro, Tax Treaty Override 107 (Wolters Kluwer 2014).
59. Van Weeghel, supra n. 57, at 25; Arnold & van Weeghel, supra n. 57, at 
89 et seq.; De Broe, supra n. 57, at 403 et seq.
60. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 paras. 9.2 and 22 (2003).
61. Id., at paras. 9.2 and 22.1.
62. Id., at para. 27.5.
63. Id., at para. 27.6.
64. Id., at para. 27.7.
65. Id., at para. 27.9.
66. Id., at paras. 9.2 and 22.1.
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lute stance. First of all, as will be shown, the application 
of domestic anti-avoidance is not unlimited. Rather, the 
scope of these rules seems to be limited by the guiding 
principle. Second, the OECD Commentaries nuance the 
position taken by noting that:
[w]hilst these rules do not conf lict with tax conventions, there is 
agreement that member countries should carefully observe the 
specific obligations enshrined in tax treaties to relieve double
taxation as long as there is no clear evidence that the treaties
are being abused.67 
In light of the foregoing, it seems logical that the OECD 
would have seized the opportunity provided by the 
BEPS initiative to firmly advocate a policy that, on the 
one hand, gives GAARs a treaty foundation and, on 
the other hand, switches off the application of domestic 
anti-avoidance in a treaty context. While the first objec-
tive was accomplished with the PPT rule, the principle 
that domestic anti-avoidance rules do not conflict with 
tax treaties remains unchanged. Rather, the 2017 updated 
OECD Commentaries elegantly try to reconcile domestic 
anti-avoidance rules with the PPT rule. In this context, 
the PPT rule is then assigned the function of limiting, if 
necessary, the scope and effect of domestic anti-avoidance 
rules to the extent that these rules will not be compatible 
with the new treaty GAAR.68 With a view to keeping this 
article within manageable proportions, this latter issue 
will not be discussed further. Rather, the author focuses 
exclusively on the interaction between the PTT rule and 
specific treaty SAARs.
2.3.2.2.  The unwritten prohibition of abuse
The second option referred to by the 2003 OECD Com-
mentaries, which is favoured by some countries, relies on 
the object and purpose of tax conventions as well as the 
obligation to interpret them in good faith pursuant to 
article 31 of the VCLT.69 In this respect, the OECD Com-
mentaries note that:
[o]ther States prefer to view some abuses as being abuses of the 
convention itself, as opposed to abuses of domestic law. These 
States, however, then consider that a proper construction of tax
conventions allows them to disregard abusive transactions such 
as those entered into with the view to obtaining unintended ben-
efits under the provisions of these conventions.70 
This second approach acknowledges the idea, which is 
supported by some commentators, that the application of 
tax treaties is subject to an unwritten prohibition of abuse. 
In the well-known ApS case, the Swiss Supreme Court 
endorsed a similar reasoning.71 The Federal Tribunal 
deﬁned this concept by referring to the “ look-through”, 
“bona ﬁde” and “activity” provisions suggested by the 
2014 Commentaries.72 It must certainly be acknowledged 
67. Id., at para. 22.2.
68. Action 6 Final Report, at 82 et seq.; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
1 para. 74 (2017).
69. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 para. 9.3 (2003).
70. Id.
71. CH: FT, 28 Nov. 2005, 2A.239/2005.
72. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 para. 13 et seq. (2014); indeed, 
the FT stated as follows: “Wenn es im Abkommen – wie hier – an einer
ausdrücklichen Missbrauchsregelung fehlt, ist ein Abkommensmiss-
brauch gestützt auf die Transparenzklausel jedoch nur dann anzuneh-
that the bona fide clause resembles the guiding principle 
described below in the sense that it is also based on a 
purpose test:
The foregoing provisions shall not apply where the company 
establishes that the principal purpose of the company, the con-
duct of its business and the acquisition or maintenance by it of 
the shareholding or other property from which the income in 
question is derived, are motivated by sound business reasons 
and do not have as primary purpose the obtaining of any bene-
fits under this Convention.73 
However, as the author has argued,74 these provisions 
are merely drafting suggestions that states may decide to 
incorporate into their tax treaties. Accordingly, it is not 
possible to define a general and unwritten prohibition of 
abuse on the basis of specific drafting suggestions. Rather, 
for the purpose of determining what constitutes an abuse, 
the Federal Tribunal should have referred to the guiding 
principle addressed in the next section. 
2.3.2.3.  The guiding principle
As referred to earlier, in 2003, a “guiding principle” was 
introduced in the OECD Commentaries in order to 
tackle treaty abuse. Subsequently, the 2014 Commentar-
ies provide that: 
[i]t is important to note, however, that it should not be lightly
assumed that a taxpayer is entering into the type of abusive
transactions referred to above. A guiding principle is that the
benefits of a double taxation convention should not be avail-
able where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions 
or arrangements was to secure a more favourable tax position
and obtaining that more favourable treatment in these circum-
stances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the rel-
evant provisions.75 
The guiding principle incorporates a subjective (“a main 
purpose”) and objective (“more favourable tax position”) 
requirement. According to the OECD, the PPT rule merely 
represents a codification of this guiding principle, as will 
be discussed. Thus, the conditions of the guiding prin-
ciple will be discussed and compared with those of the 
PPT rule. 
The nature and function of the guiding principle under 
the 2003 OECD Commentaries is controversial. A first 
possibility is to consider that the guiding principle is in 
fact a treaty GAAR. A second possibility is to consider, by 
contrast, that the guiding principle represents a general 
standard which states are required to comply with when 
denying treaty benefits on the basis of a domestic or a 
treaty GAAR. This second interpretation f lows from the 
structure of the 2003 OECD Commentaries to Article 1 
of the OECD Model. Indeed, the denial of treaty bene-
fits on the basis of domestic or treaty principles is dis-
cussed respectively under paragraphs 9.2 and 9.3 of the 
men, wenn die betreffende (dänische) Gesellschaft zusätzlich keine 
echten wirtschaftlichen bzw. aktiven Geschäftstätigkeiten ausübt”. 
(see OECD, supra n. 69, at para. 3.6.3.).
73. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 para. 19 (2014).
74. R. Danon, Le concept de bénéficiaire effectif dans le cadre du MC OCDE:
Réf lexions et analyse de la jurisprudence récente, IFF Forum für Steuer-
recht 1, 38 et seq. (2007) .
75. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 para. 9.5 (2014).
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2003 Commentary to Article 1. Paragraph 9.4 then goes 
on to say that:
[u]nder both approaches, therefore, it is agreed that States do
not have to grant the benefits of a double taxation convention 
where arrangements that constitute an abuse of the provisions
of the convention have been entered into. 
Finally, paragraph 9.5 of the 2013 Commentary to Article 
1 of the OECD Model sets out the guiding principle, which 
clearly suggests that it represents a general limitation to 
both approaches. From this perspective, the approach fol-
lowed by paragraph 9.5 is similar to that favoured by the 
2010 OECD Commentaries in relation to article 15(2)(b) 
of the OECD Model.76 Indeed, while the 2010 Commen-
taries update allows the state of source to apply its own 
domestic tax definition of employment income to deny 
the application of article 15(2) of the 2014 OECD Model,77 
the Commentaries contain several principles designed to 
distinguish a contract for services from an employment 
relationship. Similar to the guiding principle, these cri-
teria represent a “maximum standard” under which the 
state of source could deny the application of article 15(2) 
of the 2014 OECD Model. This maximum standard may 
be used, in particular in the context of a mutual agree-
ment procedure.78 
By contrast, the PPT rule introduced by BEPS Action 6 and 
the MLI represents, of course, a genuine treaty GAAR. As 
a matter of fact, the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries 
now even seem to equate the guiding principle to the PPT 
rule in the sense that where the applicable tax treaty does 
not contain such a rule, benefits could be directly denied 
on the basis of the guiding principle.79 However, given the 
introduction of the PPT rule in the text of the 2017 OECD 
Model and in numerous tax treaties further to the BEPS 
outcome, the question of the status and function of the 
guiding principle will obviously be less important. 
The OECD Commentaries do not expressly address the 
impact of domestic and treaty GAARs on conduit and 
abusive restructuring cases. It is, however, quite clear that 
these rules have a broader scope than beneficial owner-
ship and would thus not only come into play in a (limited) 
conduit but also in other fact patterns. For example, a 
treaty GAAR complying with the guiding principle may 
be used to deny the application of a more favourable dis-
tributive rule (for instance, a lower residual withholding 
tax on dividends) in the context of a rule shopping case. 
This being said, where a treaty SAAR is already applica-
ble to a given factual situation, the question arises as to 
whether a more general treaty anti-avoidance rule may 
still be applied to the same factual situation. The answer 
to this question under the 2014 OECD Commentaries is 
discussed in section 2.3.3. with a view to contrasting it, 
76. For a recent discussion, see, for example, R. Danon, La notion d’employ-
eur au sens de l’art. 15(2)(b) MC OCDE. Analyse critique du commentaire 
OCDE et impact sur les CDI suisses, IFF Forum für Steuerrecht, 89 et seq.
(2012).
77. This would typically concern states defining “employment income” by
reference to a substance-over-form approach. 
78. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 15 para. 8.12 (2010).
79. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 para. 61 (2017).
at a later stage, with the approach favoured in relation to 
the PPT rule. 
2.3.3.  Relation between treaty SAARs and GAARs 
The author now turns to the last problem that he would 
like to discuss in relation to treaty abuse in the pre-
BEPS era, namely the relation between treaty SAARs 
and GAARs. The issue is not specifically addressed by 
the OECD Commentaries. However, it f lows from the 
OECD Commentaries that the OECD clearly considers 
that specific and general anti-avoidance rules complement 
each other with states being encouraged to resort to both 
measures. Hence, paragraph 9.6 of the Commentaries to 
article 1 states that:
[t]he potential application of general anti-abuse provisions does
not mean that there is no need for the inclusion, in tax con-
ventions, of specific provisions aimed at preventing particular 
forms of tax avoidance. Where specific avoidance techniques
have been identified or where the use of such techniques is espe-
cially problematic, it will often be useful to add to the Conven-
tion provisions that focus directly on the relevant avoidance
strategy. 
In a second interesting statement, which has already been 
mentioned, the 2014 Commentaries acknowledge that the 
scope of beneficial ownership is by essence limited and 
therefore may not cover all fact patterns leading to treaty 
abuse:
[W]hilst the concept of “beneficial owner” deals with some
forms of tax avoidance (i.e. those involving the interposition
of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the dividend to some-
one else), it does not deal with other cases of treaty shopping
and must not, therefore, be considered as restricting in any way 
the application of other approaches to addressing such cases.80 
In the author’s opinion, the issue becomes relevant where 
a specific and a general anti-avoidance rule are potentially 
applicable to the same fact pattern.81 Suppose that the div-
idend article of the applicable tax treaty contains a holding 
period requirement (SAAR) designed to prevent abusive 
share transfers. Assume as a second example that a state 
construes the beneficial ownership requirement broadly 
(such as Switzerland for instance) and applies such test 
to deny treaty benefits in conduit situations. Would a 
domestic or treaty GAAR still be applicable to the same 
fact pattern in these two instances, namely the abusive 
restructuring and the conduit situation? 
I have argued elsewhere that the problem should be settled 
pursuant to the lex specialis derogat legi generali princi-
ple. Accordingly, to the extent that the SAAR covers the 
factual situation at issue, the latter may not, in addition, 
be tested in light of a GAAR. Therefore, under this line of 
reasoning, the application of a GAAR is only of a subsid-
iary nature.82 In Switzerland, the Federal Administrative 
80. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 10 para. 2 (2014).
81. See Danon, supra n. 8, at 49 et seq.
82. Id.; see also, previously in the same vein, D. Ward, Abuse of Tax Trea-
ties 184 (Kluwer Law Online 1995): “One consequence, however, is that
where a general anti-abuse provision has been written into a treaty, it
may not be possible to imply that the parties intended the continued
application of any … other anti-abuse rule that might, in due course, 
receive international acceptance”; of the same opinion, see L. de Broe
& E. von Frenckell, La notion de “bénéficiaire effectif ”, 81 Archiv für 
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Tribunal expressly endorsed this opinion in judgments of 
25 June 2014.83 As a matter of fact, the Federal Tribunal 
had already gone in the same direction – albeit without 
exploring the consequences of this reasoning – in a judg-
ment of 2006 holding that a treaty GAAR could only come 
into play “en l’absence de normes spéciales”.84 This posi-
tion is the most compatible with article 31 et seq. of the 
VCLT. First of all, it is in line with the literal interpretation, 
which, in the field of tax treaty interpretation, is of pre-
dominant importance as the text is generally deemed to 
ref lect the common intention of the parties. Accordingly, 
if the parties have agreed to tackle a specific fact pattern 
using a SAAR, it must be considered that the same factual 
situation may not fall within the scope of a GAAR (literal 
argument). Second, if a fact pattern covered by a SAAR 
could also be reviewed in light of a GAAR, the SAAR 
would become meaningless and would have no scope of 
its own (systematic interpretation).85 It must, however, be 
pointed out that the scope of the SAAR should be clearly 
ascertained. Hence, if a state favours a restrictive inter-
pretation of beneficial ownership in line with the 2014 
OECD Commentaries with the result that this notion 
only targets some blatant conduit arrangements, it goes 
Schweizerisches Abgaberecht 5, 287-288 (2012/2013); M. Lang, BEPS 
Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties, 658 Tax Notes 
Int’l (2014), illustrates this reasoning using a good example: “if, for 
example, the immovable property clause of art. 13 (4) of the OECD 
Model covers the alienation of shares ‘deriving more than 50 per cent 
of their value directly or indirectly from immovable property’, it is hard 
to understand why the general anti-abuse rule should in some cases 
reduce the percentage to 50 percent or less”; A.B. Moreno, GAARs and 
Treaties: From the Guiding Principle to the Principal Purpose Test. What 
Have We Gained from BEPS Action 6 p.440 (Kluwer Law Online 2017).
83. CH: FAT, 25 June 2014, A-4693/2013 (partially confirmed by CH: FT, 3 
Dec. 2015, 2C_753/2014) and A-4689/2013 (partially confirmed by CH:
FT, 27 Nov. 2015, 2C_752/2014), para. 7.6: 
Dans tous les cas, l’interdiction (générale et implicite) de l’abus de 
droit (au sens d’utilisation abusive d’une convention) ne saurait être 
invoquée lorsque l’état de fait litigieux est déjà soumis à un disposi-
tif anti-abus spécifique par la convention concernée elle-même (par 
exemple la règle sur le bénéficiaire effectif; cf. R. Danon, in: IFF 
2007/1, p. 49). Si tel est le cas, ce volet du litige ne pourra plus être 
réexaminé à la lumière de l’interdiction de l’abus de droit. L’applica-
tion de ce concept général dans ce cadre priverait en effet le dispositif 
anti-abus spécifique de toute portée propre et ne serait pas compat-
ible avec le principe de l’interprétation littérale des conventions. En 
revanche, la réserve générale de l’abus de droit demeure applicable, à 
titre subsidiaire, aux autres composantes de l’état de fait (par exemple 
parce qu’une société, pourtant bénéficiaire effectif d’un revenu, a été 
intercalée dans le seul but de contourner l’impôt). Ce raisonnement 
s’applique aussi lorsque le dispositif anti-abus du droit international 
est implicite, comme cela arrive parfois avec la règle du bénéficiaire 
effectif (sur tout ce sujet et avec des exemples, cf. R. Danon, in: IFF 
2007/1, p. 51). 
Hence, under this case law, where a fact pattern falls within the scope 
of a SAAR, the GAAR may not be applied to the same fact pattern. The 
existence of abuse under the GAAR may, however, constitute a factual 
indication that the conditions laid down by the SAAR are satisfied and 
that treaty benefits should be denied (same judgments, para. 8.4): 
Toutefois, et bien qu’il ne faille pas confondre la notion d’abus de 
droit et celle de bénéficiaire effectif (cf. consid. 6.6 et 7.6 ci-dessus), 
ces arguments peuvent servir d’indices complémentaires pour con-
firmer le fait que la recourante ne revêt pas la qualité de bénéficiaire 
effectif du dividende. En effet, lorsque l’intercalation d’une société 
constitue un abus de droit, il y a tout lieu de présumer que celle-ci 
ne sera pas non plus le bénéficiaire effectif de ses revenus. Il se justi-
fie donc d’examiner, par surabondance de motifs, la problématique 
de l’abus de droit.
84. CH: FT, 4 Apr. 2006, 2A.416/2005, para. 4.2.
85. Danon, supra n. 8, at 49 et seq.
without saying that the GAAR would remain applicable 
to the more sophisticated conduit situations. 
This being said, with the general introduction of the PPT 
rule in tax treaties, the question will arise as to whether the 
foregoing reasoning will be able to be maintained in the 
post-BEPS world. As will be shown, the PPT rule applies 
indeed “[n]otwithstanding any provisions of a Covered 
Tax Agreement”. This language could therefore militate in 
favour of a cumulative application of SAARs and GAARs 
to the same factual situation. However, as the author will 
demonstrate, the foregoing position remains, in essence, 
valid if the PPT rule is properly construed and its 2017 
updated OECD Commentaries are contextually taken 
into account. 
The author now moves to the BEPS responses to treaty 
abuse, beginning with a general overview of the mea-
sures stemming from BEPS Action 6 and then distin-
guishing between minimum standards (see section 3.2.), 
on the one hand, and recommendations (see section 3.3.), 
on the other. The author then focusses on the PPT rule 
(see section 4.).
3.  overview of the BEPS responses to Treaty
Abuse
3.1.  Introductory remarks
As previously stated, the BEPS responses to treaty abuse 
have been laid down in part III of the MLI. In line with 
the outcome of BEPS Action 6, the MLI distinguishes, 
however, between minimum standards and those provi-
sions that states may choose to apply (opt-in) or not to 
apply (opt-out). 
3.2.  Minimum standards
3.2.1.  Amendment to the preamble text
The minimum standards that jurisdictions are required to 
include in their tax treaties (through the MLI or bilaterally 
on the basis of an amending protocol) are the following: 
To begin, an express statement amending the preamble 
text of tax treaties states the following:
Intending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes 
covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for 
non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoid-
ance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed 
at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect 
benefit of residents of third jurisdictions).86 
Pursuant to the compatibility clause of article 6(2) of the 
MLI, this text will then be included in the CTAs in lieu 
of or in the absence of an identical preamble language. 
In addition, the parties may choose to include the fol-
lowing language: “Desiring to further develop their eco-
nomic relationship and to enhance their co-operation in 
86. Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting art. 6(1) (24 Nov. 2016), Treaties 
IBFD (hereinafter: “MLI”); OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multi-
lateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, para. 75 et seq. (24 Nov. 2016), Treaties 
IBFD [hereinafter: Explanatory Statement].
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tax matters”.87  Because, under article 31(2) of the VCLT, 
the context of a treaty includes its preamble, BEPS Action 
6 notes that the foregoing statement and objectives ought 
to be taken into account when interpreting and applying 
the provisions of the relevant tax treaty.88 According to the 
OECD, this holds true in particular as regards the inter-
pretation of the PPT rule. However, certain authors rightly 
submit that this line of reasoning should not be blown out 
of proportion. In particular, the fact that the prevention 
of tax avoidance is now listed among the objectives of the 
OECD Model does not mean that a treaty must at any rate 
be construed so as to achieve that objective. The treaty’s 
object and purpose is only one of the elements that need 
to be considered for interpretation purposes and it cannot 
override its clear substantive provisions.89 In the author’s 
opinion, the following distinctions should be made. First 
of all, although in the future it will be clear from the pre-
amble of tax treaties that the latter should not be used to 
create double non-taxation, their primary objective will 
continue to be the avoidance of double taxation. Accord-
ingly, this hierarchy may not be ignored in the interpre-
tative process. Second and most importantly, the objec-
tives in the preamble should not be used to deny treaty 
benefits beyond the text or the scope of the potentially 
applicable treaty anti-avoidance provision. However, on 
this latter point, the PPT rule raises problems. Indeed, 
while the objective criterion of the rule requires an anal-
ysis to be made in light of the “object and purpose of the 
relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement”,90 in 
most instances, “the object and purpose of the tax conven-
tion”91  is relied upon instead because it generally appears 
difficult to assign a particular objective to the applicable 
treaty rule.
3.2.2.  Introduction of a PPT rule or LOB clause with 
anti-conduit mechanism
With respect to substantive treaty anti-avoidance rules, 
jurisdictions may implement the minimum standards 
in several fashions. First, states may opt for the PPT rule 
combined with a simplified LOB clause.92 As a general 
rule, however, the principle of symmetry applies. Accord-
ingly, where one party chooses to apply the simplified LOB 
and the other does not, the simplified LOB would gener-
ally not apply, and, by default, the PPT rule would apply 
between the parties.93 BEPS Action 6 stresses that LOB 
clauses and the PTT rules are provisions that comple-
ment each other.94 While an LOB clause is indeed based 
on objective criteria and provides certainty, it is, however, 
limited to certain specific treaty shopping situations and 
should not address any other forms of treaty abuse, such 
87. Art. 6(3) MLI.
88. Action 6 Final Report, at 92.
89. L. De Broe, Tax Treaty and EU Law aspects of the LOB and PPT provision
proposed by BEPS action 6, in Institute for Tax Law 203-204 (Kluwer/
Schulthess 2017).
90. Art. 7(1) MLI.
91. See, for example, Action 6 Final Report, at 59 et seq.; OECD Model: Com-
mentary on Article 29 para. 182, Examples A, B, C, D (2017).
92. Art. 7(6) MLI; Explanatory Statement, at para. 100.
93. Id.
94. Action 6 Final Report, at 20.
as conduit financing arrangements. For this reason, there-
fore, the PTT rule is needed.95 
Based on the foregoing, states are given two alternative 
options. A first alternative is to opt for the PPT rule alone.96 
However, in this particular instance, the state choosing to 
apply the PPT alone may still permit the application of the 
simplified LOB on an asymmetrical basis.97 The second 
alternative concerns states that favour LOB clauses but 
do not wish to include, for various reasons, a PPT rule in 
their tax treaties. Article 7(15)(a) of the MLI allows these 
states to opt out of the PPT rule, provided that they sup-
plement the LOB clause with a mechanism designed to 
deal with conduit arrangements. This mechanism may 
take the form of a treaty PPT rule restricted to conduit 
arrangements, domestic anti-abuse rules or simply judi-
cial doctrines achieving a similar result. An example of 
this policy is, of course, the US conduit financing treasury 
regulations.98 The policy principle, however, is that these 
various options should achieve a similar result to that of 
the PPT rule.99 
In essence, therefore, the PPT rule is the only approach 
that is considered to be able to achieve the minimum stan-
dard on its own,100 which is yet another reason justifying 
the focus of this article and the extensive analysis of this 
rule.101 
3.3.  Recommendations 
3.3.1.  Introductory remarks
In addition to the foregoing minimum standards, the 
MLI, in line with BEPS Action 6, contains a number of 
specific anti-abuse rules designed to tackle particular 
forms of treaty abuse.102 However, for all of these SAARs, 
an opt-out mechanism is provided so that states may freely 
reserve the right not to apply them to their CTAs. In order 
to keep this article within manageable proportions, the 
author therefore presents these rules brief ly hereafter, 
merely outlining their policy objectives. The relationship 
and interaction of these specific provisions with the PPT 
rule will also be addressed.
95. Id., at 19.




97. Art. 7(7) MLI.
98. § 1.881-3 – Conduit financing arrangements.
99. Action 6 Final Report, at 19, 65-66; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 187 (2017).
100. Explanatory Statement, at para. 75 et seq.
101. However, states also enjoy a certain level of f lexibility with regard to 
how they will implement the PPT rule itself. Art. 7(15)(b) MLI states 
that they may reserve the right to apply the PPT rule provided by the
MLI to CTAs that already contain a similar rule. In that case, states must 
submit to the Depositary the list of CTAs and corresponding treaty pro-
visions concerned (art. 28(8)(e) MLI.). If they decide not to make that 
reservation, states must also submit to the Depositary the list of CTAs 
and treaty provisions that will be superseded by the PPT rule. Should 
both contracting states make that notification, the PPT rule will apply 
“in lieu” of the anti-abuse provision contained in the CTA. However, in 
the absence of such notification by one or both contracting states, the 
PPT rule applies only to the extent that those anti-abuse provisions are 
incompatible with the PPT rule (art. 7(17)(a) MLI, second phrase).
102. Action 6 Final Report, at 20.
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3.3.2.  Dividend transfer transactions
The first provision, which is included in article 8 (dividend 
transfer transactions), is designed to tackle the abusive 
restructurings described which lead to the application of 
a more favourable treaty (treaty shopping) or distributive 
rule (rule shopping). For this purpose, a holding period 
is introduced into the dividend. Accordingly, in its 2017 
updated version, article 10(2)(a) of the OECD Model103 
provides:
5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the benefi-
cial owner is a company (other than a partnership) which holds 
directly at least 25 per cent of the capital of the company paying 
the dividends throughout a 365 day period that includes the day 
of the payment of the dividend (for the purpose of computing 
that period, no account shall be taken of changes of ownership 
that would directly result from a corporate reorganisation, such 
as a merger or divisive reorganisation, of the company that holds 
the shares or that pays the dividend).104 
The author observes that this problem has already been 
discussed in earlier Commentaries on Article 10. These 
earlier Commentaries indeed stated that the reduced rate 
(5%) provided in paragraph 2 should not be granted in 
cases of abuse, and which recommend that states intro-
duce in their tax treaties a specific PPT rule stipulating 
that treaty benefits should only be granted if the holding 
“was not acquired primarily for the purpose of taking 
advantage of this provision”.105 The approach taken by the 
new dividend transaction rule is, however, different in the 
sense that it is based on an objective criterion, namely the 
holding period. 
3.3.3.  Capital gains from alienation of real estate entities
The second updated amendment concerns article 13(4) 
of the OECD Model.106 As it stands, this provision allows 
the state in which immovable property is situated to tax 
capital gains realized by a resident of the other contracting 
state on shares of companies that derive more than 50% 
of their value from such property. This rule may also be 
extended to gains resulting from the alienation of inter-
ests in other entities, such as partnerships or trusts.107 
However, as mentioned earlier, the application of article 
13(4) of the OECD Model may be avoided if, shortly before 
the sale of the shares, assets are contributed to the entity to 
dilute the proportion of the value of these shares resulting 
from immovable property located in the state of source. 
In order to address this form of abuse specifically, article 
13(4) of the 2017 OECD Model has been amended as 
follows:
Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alien-
ation of shares or comparable interests, such as interests in a 
partnership or trust, may be taxed in the other Contracting State 
if, at any time during the 365 days preceding the alienation, these 
shares or comparable interests derived more than 50 per cent of 
their value directly or indirectly from immovable property, as 
103. In the 2017 updated OECD Model Commentary, Luxembourg reserved
the right not to include this holding period. OECD Model: Commentary 
on Article 10 para. 118 (2017).
104. See Explanatory Statement, at para. 118 et seq.
105. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 10 para. 17 (2014).
106. Art. 9 MLI.
107. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 13 para. 28.5 (2017).
defined in Article 6, situated in that the other State may be taxed 
in that other State.108 
However, a broader policy issue, which is not addressed 
by the MLI, but which was analysed in an IMF/OECD/
UN/WBG discussion draft released on 1 August 2017 
and opened for comments until 25 September 2017, is the 
question of whether and, if so, under what conditions, 
capital gains resulting from offshore indirect transfers 
(OITs) should generally be taxable by the country in which 
the asset indirectly sold is located.109 
3.3.4.  Anti-abuse rule for low-taxed PEs in triangular 
cases
The third rule introduced by article 10 of the MLI is an 
anti-abuse rule for permanent establishments (PEs) situ-
ated in third jurisdictions. This rule targets states exempt-
ing – on the basis of treaty (article 23A of the OECD 
Model) or domestic law – profits attributable to a low-
taxed PE situated in a third country. The policy of this 
rule, which was inspired by US treaty practice, is that the 
state of source should not be expected to grant treaty ben-
efits where, in a triangular situation, income paid to a resi-
dent of the other contracting state is exempt on the ground 
of its allocation to a PE situated in a third country. The 
problem is not new and has been addressed in previous 
OECD documents and referred to in its Commentaries.110 
This provision has been inserted in article 29(8)(a) of the 
2017 updated OECD Model and reads as follows:
Where (i) an enterprise of a Contracting State derives income 
from the other Contracting State and the first-mentioned State 
treats such income as attributable to a permanent establish-
ment of the enterprise situated in a third jurisdiction, and (ii) 
the profits attributable to that permanent establishment are 
exempt from tax in the first-mentioned State, the benefits of 
this Convention shall not apply to any item of income on which 
the tax in the third jurisdiction is less than the lower of [rate to be 
determined bilaterally] the amount of that item of income and 
60 per cent of the tax that would be imposed in the first-men-
tioned State on that item of income if that permanent estab-
lishment were situated in the first-mentioned State. In such a 
case any income to which the provisions of this paragraph apply 
shall remain taxable according to the domestic law of the other 
State, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Convention. 
In the case of low-taxed passive income, however, the rule 
would, of course, not apply if, despite generally exempting 
profits attributable to PEs, the state of residence applies a 
“switch-over clause” leading to the ordinary taxation of 
the passive income in that state.
In addition, the clause contains an active business test 
exclusion in the sense that it would not apply where 
income emanates from, or is incidental to, the active 
conduct of a business through a permanent establishment, 
which excludes an investment business that is not carried 
108. Action 6 Final Report, at 71; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 13
para. 28.9 (2017).
art. 13 N 28.9.
109. See discussion draft, The Platform for Collaboration on Tax, The Tax-
ation of Offshore Indirect Transfers – A Toolkit; available at www.oecd.
org/tax/discussion-draft-toolkit-taxation-of-offshore-indirect-trans 
fers.pdf.
110. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 24 at para. 31 (2017).
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on by a bank, insurance enterprise or registered securities 
dealer.111 Where the conditions of article 29(8)(a) would 
otherwise be met, however, a discretionary relief mecha-
nism remains available.112 
3.3.5.  Savings clause 
Last but not least, article 11 of the MLI deals with the 
introduction of a “savings clause”.113 Article 1(3) of the 
2017 updated OECD Model thus states that
[t]his Convention shall not affect the taxation, by a Contracting 
State, of its residents except with respect to the benefits granted 
under paragraph 3 of Article 7, paragraph 2 of Article 9 and
Articles 19, 20, 23 [A] [B], 24, 25 and 28.
As expected, several jurisdictions (in particular France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzer-
land) have reserved the right not to include the savings 
clause in their tax treaties.114 
4.  The PPT rule
4.1.  Presentation and origin of the rule 
According to the OECD, the PPT rule as provided under 
articles 7(1) of the MLI and 29(9) of the 2017 OECD Model 
would merely codify the guiding principle embodied in 
paragraph 9.5 of the 2003 Commentary to Article 1115 as 
already presented. As is clear from the following compar-
ison, the text of the PPT rule is materially not fully iden-
tical to that of the guiding principle. 
There are indeed two obvious differences. First, unlike the 
guiding principle, the PPT rule applies “[n]otwithstanding 
the other provisions of this Convention”. Second, the PPT 
rule comes into play “unless it is established that grant-
ing that benefit in these circumstances would be in accor-
dance with the object and purpose of the relevant pro-
visions of the Covered Tax Agreement”. On this second 
point, the PPT rule is regarded as controversial since 
111. Id., art. 29(8)(b).
112. Id., art. 29(8)(c). The existence of a loss situation may typically consist
of a valid ground for a discretionary relief. 
113. For a critical discussion, see, among others, G. Kof ler, Some Ref lections 
on the ‘Saving Clause’, 44 Intertax 8/9 (2016), available at http://www.
kluwerlawonline.com/TAXI2016048; V. Chand, Should States Opt for 
the Saving Clause In the Multilateral Instrument, Tax Notes Interna-
tional, 689 et seq. ( 2017). 
114. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 para. 117 (2017).
115. Action 6 Final Report, at 55, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 169 (2017).
it shifts the burden of proof to the taxpayer.116 The tax 
administration must indeed only demonstrate that “it is 
reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts 
and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of 
the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction 
that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit”. 
From the taxpayer’s perspective, it must then be “estab-
lished that granting that benefit in these circumstances 
would be in accordance with the object and purpose of 
the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement”.117 
The compatibility of this division of the burden of proof 
with domestic and EU law is debatable.118 
Turning now to the substantive analysis of the PPT rule, 
the author distinguishes between its material scope, on the 
one hand, and its requirements, on the other. 
4.2.  Material scope
4.2.1.  “A benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement”
As to its material scope, the PPT rule first of all refers to “a 
benefit”. According to BEPS Action 6 and the 2017 updated 
OECD Commentaries, the term “benefit” includes all 
limitations (e.g. a tax reduction, exemption, deferral or 
refund) on taxation imposed on the state of source under 
the distributive rules,119 the relief from double taxation120 
and the protection afforded to residents and nationals of 
a contracting state under the non-discrimination provi-
sion.121 In particular,122 the PPT rule is potentially appli-
cable to dividends,123 interest,124 royalties125 and capital 
gains.126 There is a scholarly discussion with regard to 
whether the term “benefit” refers to the taxation of one 
contracting state or to the overall tax burden in both con-
116. De Broe, supra n. 89, at 216; Lang, supra n. 82, at 658; V. Chand, The Inter-
action of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules with Tax Treaties 190 (Schul-
thess 2017); Moreno, supra n. 82, at 435.
117. Action 6 Final Report, at 55; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29 
para. 170 (2017): “the last part of the paragraph allows the person to
whom the benefit would otherwise be denied the possibility of estab-
lishing that obtaining the benefit in these circumstances would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of 
this Convention”.
118. De Broe, supra n. 89, at 216.
119. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 6 and Article 22 (2017).
120. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 23 A and B (2017).
121. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 24 (2017).
122. Action 6 Final Report; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29 para. 
175 (2017).
123. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 10 (2017).
124.  OECD Model: Commentary on Article 11 (2017).
125.  OECD Model: Commentary on Article 12 (2017).
126.  OECD Model: Commentary on Article 13 (2017).
Guiding principle (paragraph 9.5 of the OECD Model 
Commentary on Article 1) 
PPT rule 
(article 29(9) of the 2017 OECD Model) 
“a guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation 
convention should not be available where a main purpose 
for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to 
secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more 
favourable treatment in these circumstances would be contrary 
to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions”.
“notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a 
benefit under this Convention shall not be granted in respect 
of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, 
having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that 
obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any 
arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly 
in that benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit 
in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object 
and purpose of the relevant provisions of this Convention”.
42 BullETIN for INTErNATIoNAl TAxATIoN January 2018 © IBFD
robert J. Danon
tracting states combined.127 In the author’s opinion, the 
term “benefit” exclusively covers the reduction of domes-
tic taxation that the state applying the tax treaty must 
accept under the applicable distributive rule (for example, 
a reduction of source taxation in the case of dividends, 
interest and royalties).128 
The benefit to which the PPT rule refers must be provided 
“under this Convention”. As correctly pointed out by com-
mentators, it consequently follows that the PPT may not be 
used to deny a benefit stemming exclusively from domes-
tic law (for example, a participation exemption) or another 
tax treaty129. Similarly, for these reasons, a lower domestic 
corporate income tax in the residence state is not a covered 
benefit for the purpose of the PPT rule. 
4.2.2.  “In respect of an item of income or capital”
The PPT rule is applicable “in respect of an item of income 
or capital”. Therefore, the PPT rule is a provision that 
requires an item-by-item of income analysis. In other 
words, where an entity derives different kinds of income, 
the PPT rule could lead to the denial of treaty benefits for 
some income streams, but not for others. From this per-
spective, the PPT rule is similar to the beneficial own-
ership requirement and differs from an LOB provision, 
which, on the contrary, focuses on whether the taxpayer 
is a “qualified person”.
4.2.3.  Impact on conduit and transfer situations
Like the guiding principle, the scope of the PPT also 
extends to both conduit and abusive restructuring cases. 
The application of the PPT rule to restructuring situations 
first of all follows from the language of the term “arrange-
ment or transaction”, which should be construed broad-
ly.130 Indeed, the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries 
mention that these terms include: 
the creation, assignment, acquisition or transfer of the income 
itself, or of the property or right in respect of which the income 
accrues. These terms also encompass arrangements concerning 
the establishment, acquisition or maintenance of a person who 
derives the income, including the qualification of that person as 
a resident of one of the Contracting States, and include steps that 
persons may take themselves in order to establish residence.131 
Second, the expression “resulted directly or indirectly in 
that benefit” also confirms this analysis.132 Therefore, this 
notion implies that treaty benefits may, for instance, be 
denied by the state of source if these benefits indirectly 
result from an abusive restructuring. Hence, as discussed 
by the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries, this would 
typically hold true where a resident of a third state trans-
127. De Broe, supra n. 89, at 208; Lang, supra n. 82, at 657.
128. Of the same opinion, De Broe, supra n. 89, at 208.
129. If this other tax treaty is applicable, the latter, however, likely contains
its own anti-abuse rules, in particular a PPT rule.
130. Action 6 Final Report, at 57; OECD, supra n. 50, at 235, art. 29 N 177.
131. Action 6 Final Report, at 57; OECD, supra n. 50, at 235, art. 29 N 177. An 
example of an “arrangement” would be where steps are taken to ensure 
that meetings of the board of directors of a company are held in a dif-
ferent country in order to claim that the company has changed its res-
idence (OECD, supra n. 50, at 235, art. 29 N 177).
132. See also Lang, supra n. 82, at 659.
fers a loan granted to a subsidiary in the source state (“state 
S”) in exchange for promissory notes. In these circum-
stances, the PPT rule may apply if it is established that 
one of the principal purposes of transferring its loan to a 
resident of the residence state (“state R”) was to obtain the 
benefit of the R-S tax treaty.133 Other examples of poten-
tially problematic restructurings referred to by the 2017 
updated OECD Commentaries are transfers of residence 
to a contracting state,134 assignment to a resident (inde-
pendent financial institution) of the right to the payment 
of dividends that have been declared but have not yet been 
paid,135 or the sale by a non-resident to a resident of the 
usufruct of newly issued non-voting preferred shares in 
exchange for a price corresponding to the present value 
of the dividends to be paid on the preferred shares over a 
three-year period.136  These fact patterns are well known in 
tax treaty practice and, as previously mentioned, have, in 
particular, been dealt with in France in the Bank of Scot-
land case137 and in the Netherlands in the Royal Dutch Oil 
Company (“market maker case”) decision.138 The fact that 
these situations are not classified as conduit situations but 
rather fall under the general Commentaries to the PPT 
rule shows that the abuse in these instances is more rooted 
in a restructuring than in an ownership element. 
The PPT rule also covers those restructurings that are 
expressly dealt with in the MLI, namely, in particular, 
dividend transfer transactions139 and abusive situations 
falling within the scope of the revised article 13(4) of the 
OECD Model.140 Where a state has reserved the right not 
to apply these provisions, the PPT rule would thus apply 
by default to those situations. A more delicate situation is 
involved where states have opted for these specific rules. 
In such a case, the relationship between these provisions 
and the PPT must be settled. The issue is discussed in the 
following sections.
Finally, it is beyond doubt that the PPT rule also applies 
to conduit arrangements. The examples given by the 2017 
updated OECD Commentaries to illustrate conduit situ-
ations may indeed also be considered as exemplifying the 
application of the PPT rule in these instances.141 
4.2.4.  Relationship with BEPS Action 7 (splitting of 
contracts)
Article 5(3) of the OECD Model provides that “[a] build-
ing site or construction or installation project consti-
133. Action 6 Final Report, at 57; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 176 (2017).
134. Action 6 Final Report, at 58; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 180 (2017).
135. Action 6 Final Report, at 59; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 182, Example A (2017).
136. Action 6 Final Report, at 59-60; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 182, Example B (2017).
137. FR: CE, 29 Dec. 2006, No. 28314; see, among others, Gibert & Ouam-
rane, supra n. 28; Gutmann, supra n. 28, at 167 et seq.; Danon & Dinh,
supra n. 8, at para. 134 et seq. with regard to art. 1; Meindl-Ringler, supra 
n. 10, at 235 et seq.
138. Case no. 28 638, supra n. 16.
139. Art. 8 MLI.
140. Art. 9 MLI.
141. Action 6 Final Report, at 59-60; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 182 (2017).
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tutes a permanent establishment only if it lasts more 
than twelve months”. The Final Report on BEPS Action 7 
(“BEPS Action 7”) and the 2017 updated OECD Commen-
taries recognize that this twelve-month threshold may 
lead to abuse.142 It has indeed been found that enterprises 
(mainly contractors or subcontractors working on the 
continental shelf or engaged in activities connected with 
the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf) 
divided their contracts up into several parts, each cover-
ing a period of less than twelve months and attributed to 
a different company, which was, however, owned by the 
same group. In order to deal with the following, a spe-
cific SAAR is recommended.143 The discussion of this spe-
cific SAAR would be beyond the scope of this article. The 
author, however, observes that, having reserved the right 
not to apply this specific SAAR to their CTAs,144 coun-
tries may, as expressly confirmed by BEPS Action 7 and 
the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries, tackle this fact 
pattern on the basis of the PPT rule.145 
4.3.  The components of the PPT rule
4.3.1.  Subjective component: “One of the principal 
purposes”
From a subjective perspective, the PPT rule requires the 
objective to obtain the treaty benefit at issue to be “one of 
the principal purposes” of the arrangement or transac-
tion put into place. This condition requires an objective 
142. OECD/G20, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establish-
ment Status – Action 7: Final Report, 42-43 (OECD/G20 2015), Interna-
tional Organizations’ Documentation IBFD [hereinafter: Action 7 Final 
Report]); OECD Model: Commentary on Article 5 para. 52-53 (2017). 
143. Art. 14 (1) MLI: 
For the sole purpose of determining whether the period (or periods)
referred to in a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement that stipulates 
a period (or periods) of time after which specific projects or activities 
shall constitute a permanent establishment has been exceeded: a) 
where an enterprise of a Contracting Jurisdiction carries on activi-
ties in the other Contracting Jurisdiction at a place that constitutes 
a building site, construction project, installation project or other 
specific project identified in the relevant provision of the Covered 
Tax Agreement, or carries on supervisory or consultancy activities 
in connection with such a place, in the case of a provision of a Cov-
ered Tax Agreement that refers to such activities, and these activi-
ties are carried on during one or more periods of time that, in the 
aggregate, exceed 30 days without exceeding the period or periods 
referred to in the relevant provision of the Covered Tax Agreement; 
and b) where connected activities are carried on in that other Con-
tracting Jurisdiction at (or, where the relevant provision of the Cov-
ered Tax Agreement applies to supervisory or consultancy activities, 
in connection with) the same building site, construction or instal-
lation project, or other place identified in the relevant provision of 
the Covered Tax Agreement during different periods of time, each 
exceeding 30 days, by one or more enterprises closely related to the 
first-mentioned enterprise. 
According to the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries, the following 
factors would, in particular, be relevant in order to determine whether 
activities are connected: (i) whether the contracts covering the differ-
ent activities were concluded with the same person or related persons; 
(ii) whether the conclusion of additional contracts with a person is a 
logical consequence of a previous contract concluded with that person 
or related persons; (iii) whether the activities would have been covered
by a single contract absent tax planning considerations; (iv) whether the
nature of the work involved under the different contracts is the same or 
similar; and (v) whether the same employees are performing the activi-
ties under the different contracts.
144. Art. 14 (3) MLI.
145. Action 6 Final Report, at 42-43; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 5
para. 52-53 (2017).
analysis of the aims and objects of all persons involved 
in putting the arrangement or transaction in place or 
being a party to it.146 In other words, as is often the case 
with GAARs, the subjective component is objectified by 
a “reasonableness” criterion as evidenced by the expres-
sion “if it is reasonable to conclude”. This is, therefore, a 
factual analysis and all circumstances surrounding the 
arrangement or event must be considered on a case-by-
case basis.147 However, in the author’s opinion, the inter-
pretation of this requirement is controversial because the 
text of the PPT rule and its 2017 updated OECD Com-
mentaries may be read as supporting both a broad and a 
narrow meaning of this requirement. On the one hand, 
it must only be “reasonable to conclude” that one of the 
principal purposes was to secure a benefit.148 Therefore, it 
is not necessary to find conclusive proof of the intent of a 
person concerned with an arrangement or transaction.149 
On the other hand, the 2017 updated OECD Commentar-
ies also state the following:
It should not be lightly assumed, however, that obtaining a ben-
efit under a tax treaty was one of the principal purposes of an 
arrangement or transaction and merely reviewing the effects of 
an arrangement will not usually enable a conclusion to be drawn 
about its purpose.150 
The subjective requirement of the PTT rule has been 
heavily criticized by some commentators. The difficulty 
of identifying an intention on the basis of an objective 
analysis is first outlined.151 The most important criticism 
concerns the fact that, as confirmed by the 2017 updated 
OECD Commentaries, the reference to “one of the prin-
cipal purposes” means that: 
obtaining the benefit under a tax convention need not be the 
sole or dominant purpose of a particular arrangement or trans-
action. It is sufficient that at least one of the principal purposes 
was to obtain the benefit.152 
The 2017 updated OECD Commentaries then go on to 
state that if, for various reasons, a person sells a property 
but, before the sale, becomes a resident of one of the con-
tracting states, and one of the principal purposes for doing 
so is to obtain a benefit under a tax treaty, the PPT rule 
could apply notwithstanding the fact that there may also 
be other principal purposes for changing the residence, 
such as facilitating the sale of the property or the rein-
vestment of the proceeds of the alienation.153 Considered 
in this light, the text of the PPT rule thus makes it easier 
for tax administrations to assume abuse since it is by no 
means required that the “sole purpose” of the arrange-
ment must consist in obtaining a tax benefit.154 As cor-
rectly pointed out by De Broe (2008), it is conceptually 
unacceptable to deny treaty benefits to a taxpayer merely 
146. Action 6 Final Report, at 57-58; OECD Model: Commentary on Article





151. See, for example, Lang, supra n. 82, at 658; Moreno, supra n. 82, at 436.
152. Action 6 Final Report, at 58; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 180 (2017).
153. Action 6 Final Report, at 58; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 180 (2017).
154. Lang, supra n. 82, at 659.
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because the obtaining of such benefits is one of the princi-
pal motives, if that taxpayer is also able to present import-
ant economic motives that are unrelated to taking advan-
tage of the tax treaty.155 This criticism is not new and was 
also made at the time the guiding principle was intro-
duced into the 2003 OECD Commentaries.156 It was sug-
gested that a reference to the “sole purpose” or to the “pre-
dominant purpose” would have been more appropriate.157 
4.3.2.  Objective component: “The object and purpose of 
the relevant provisions”
The PPT rule also focuses on an objective element, namely 
the question of whether the benefit “would be in accor-
dance with the object and purpose of the relevant provi-
sions of the Covered Tax Agreement”. There is a scholarly 
discussion on the question of whether the objective cri-
terion of the PPT rule should be examined in light of the 
objective of the applicable treaty provision or by reference 
to the treaty as a whole.158 It is quite clear that if the proper 
weight159 is given to the text of the PPT rule, the objective 
and purpose of the relevant treaty provision should solely 
be taken into account.160 
However, this approach raises several practical difficulties 
as it is generally not obvious to assign a specific purpose 
to treaty provisions such as the distributive rules whose 
general objective is simply to allocate taxing rights with a 
view to eliminating double taxation.161 Presumably for this 
reason, the approach has only been followed by the OECD 
in one example discussed in its 2017 updated OECD Com-
mentaries. In this case, following the entry into force of a 
tax treaty between states R and S, a company resident in 
state R decides to increase its shareholding in a subsidiary 
located in state S up to 25% primarily in order to obtain 
the benefit of the lower rate of tax provided by article 10(2)
(a) of the S-R treaty. In this example, however, the Com-
mentaries (correctly) arrive at the conclusion that grant-
ing treaty benefits would not be contrary to this provision:
155. De Broe, supra n. 89, at 210; of the same opinion, Lang, supra n. 82, at 
659.
156. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 para. 9.5 (2003).
157. See, in particular, De Broe, supra n. 57, at 325; in Switzerland, in a judg-
ment rendered in 2010 in relation to an abusive restructuring, the FAT 
endorsed a similar reasoning and held that an abuse may only come
into play when “die Gestaltung einzig und allein für Zwecke der Steuer-
ersparnis gewählt worden ist” (CH: FAT, 23 Mar. 2010, A-2744/2008, 
RF 2010, at 652, para. 3.10); See also R. Danon & T. Obrist, La théorie 
des “anciennes reserves”, Revue fiscale, 621 et seq. (2010); in subsequent 
judgments (see e.g. CH: FAT, 25 June 2014, A-4693/2013, at para. 7.3, 
confirmed by CH: FT, 3 Dec. 2015, 2C_753/2014; CH: FAT, 26 Aug.
2016, A-2902/2014, at para. 4.3.3, partially confirmed by CH: FT, 5 Apr. 
2017, 2C_964/2016), however, the FAT has, in line with the case law of
the FT (CH: FT, 28 Nov. 2005, 2A.239/2005), defined abuse by reference 
to the bona fide clause incorporated into the OECD Model Commentary 
as drafting suggestion (OECD Model: Commentary, supra n. 60, at para. 
13 et seq.). As outlined above, this reasoning which de facto also leads 
to a reasoning based on a “principal purpose” test is, however, metho-
dologically erroneous as it amounts to arbitrary import drafting sug-
gestions into the applicable tax treaty.
158. See, among others, De Broe, supra n. 89, at 213; Chand, supra n. 116, at 
187; Moreno, supra n. 82, at 435.
159. Within the meaning of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 
31(1) (23 May 1969), Treaties IBFD.
160. In the same vein, Moreno, supra n. 82, at 437; De Broe, supra n. 89, at 
213.
161. Id.
The facts and circumstances reveal that the decision to acquire 
these additional shares has been made primarily in order to 
obtain the benefit of the lower rate of tax provided by Article 
10 (2) a) of the treaty. In that case, although one of the princi-
pal purposes for the transaction through which the additional 
shares are acquired is clearly to obtain the benefit of Article 10 
(2) a), paragraph 9 would not apply because it may be established 
that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of Article 10 (2) a). That 
subparagraph uses an arbitrary threshold of 25 per cent for the 
purposes of determining which shareholders are entitled to the 
benefit of the lower rate of tax on dividends and it is consistent 
with this approach to grant the benefits of the subparagraph to a
taxpayer who genuinely increases its participation in a company 
in order to satisfy this requirement.162 
By contrast, in the other examples, “the object and purpose 
of the tax convention”163 is referred to in order to deter-
mine whether treaty benefits should be granted. Hence, to 
deny treaty benefits, it is contended that “it would be con-
trary to the object and purpose of the tax convention to 
grant the benefit of that exemption under this treaty-shop-
ping arrangement,”164 and in cases in which the PPT rule 
does not apply, the fact that “the general objective of tax 
conventions is to encourage cross-border investment”165 
is put forward. 
The foregoing shows that there is an inherent conceptual 
difficulty to apply the PPT rule which may entail uncer-
tainties if the decision to deny treaty benefits is simply 
made on the basis of the general purpose of the treaty as 
modified by the MLI. 
4.4.  Selected EU law perspective 
4.4.1.  EU primary law
In addition to the foregoing criticisms, the PPT rule has 
also raised several compatibility concerns from an EU law 
perspective.166 Looking at the compatibility of the PPT 
rule with EU law would deserve a study of its own and is 
thus beyond the scope of this article. However, the author 
observes that the possible frictions of the PPT rule with 
EU primary law concern, inter alia, the certainty and pro-
portionality principles.167 Legal certainty forms part of the 
fundamental principles of EU law.168 As referred to, for 
example, by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
162. Action 6 Final Report, at 61; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 182, Example E (2017).
163. See, for example, Action 6 Final Report, at 59 et seq.; OECD, supra n. 50, 
at 236, Examples A, B, C, D, art. 29 N 182.
164. See, for example, Action 6 Final Report, at 59; OECD Model: Commen-
tary on Article 29 para. 182, Example A (2017). 
165. See, for example, Action 6 Final Report, at 59; OECD Model: Commen-
tary on Article 29 para. 182, Example C (2017).
166. A.P. Dourado, Aggressive Tax Planning in EU Law and in the Light of 
BEPS: The EC Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning and BEPS
Actions 2 and 6, 56 Intertax 1 (2015); Moreno, supra n. 82, at 435.
167. See PT: ECJ, 3 Oct. 2013, Case C-282/12, Fazenda Pública v. Itelcar -
Automóveis de Aluguer, Lda, para. 44, ECJ Case Law IBFD; BE: ECJ,
5 July 2012, Case C-318/10, Société d’ investissement pour l’agriculture 
tropicale SA (SIAT) v. État Belge, paras. 58-59, ECJ Case Law IBFD; P. 
Baker, The BEPS Action Plan in the Light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse, 408 
BTR (2015) BTR, no 3, at 408; see also De Broe, supra n. 89, at 229 and 
UK: ECJ, 13 Nov. 2014, Case C-112/14, European Commission v. United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, para. 27, ECJ Case Law
IBFD.
168. See, for example, DE: ECJ, 21 Sept. 1983, Case C-205/82, Deutsche Milch-
kontor GmbH and others v. Federal Republic of Germany.
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(ECJ) in the SIAT case, it follows from this principle that 
an anti-avoidance rule must meet:
the requirements of the principle of legal certainty, in accor-
dance with which rules of law must be clear, precise and predict-
able as regards their effects, in particular where they may have 
unfavourable consequences for individuals and undertakings.169 
Whether the PPT rule is in breach of the legal certainty 
principle is, however, controversial among scholars.170 
The principle of proportionality implies, in particular, 
that where an abuse is found to exist, the taxpayer should 
be given the opportunity, without being subject to undue 
administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any 
commercial justification that there may have been for that 
transaction.171 Furthermore, it is settled case law that a 
general presumption of fraud and abuse is not justified.172 
From this perspective, the division of the burden of proof 
under the PPT is controversial.173 Moreover, the fact that 
the PPT rule does not expressly reserve genuine economic 
activities seems equally at odds with the notion of abuse 
under EU law. In a recommendation of 28 January 2016, 
the European Commission, however, addressed this latter 
point by proposing a slightly modified version of the PPT 
rule to be included in tax treaties concluded by Member 
States:174 
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a ben-
efit under this Convention shall not be granted in respect of an 
item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having 
regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining 
that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrange-
ment or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that 
benefit, unless it is established that it ref lects a genuine eco-
nomic activity or that granting that benefit in these circum-
stances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of 
the relevant provisions of this Convention.175 
Hence, under this revised version, the objective compo-
nent of the PPT rule is complemented by a “genuine eco-
nomic activity” test, which, according to the Commission, 
is necessary to align the PPT rule with the case law of the 
ECJ.176 
4.4.2.  EU secondary law (Parent-Subsidiary Directive)
Turning to EU secondary law, this reservation in favour of 
genuine activities may also be found in the GAAR clauses 
recently included in the revised version of the Parent-Sub-
sidiary Directive 2015177 and in the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
169. SIAT (C-318/10), point 58.
170. For a recent critical discussion and overview of the scholarly contro-
versy, see for, example, D. Weber, Reasonableness Test of the Principal
Purpose Test Erasmus Law Rev. 8, 48-59 (2017).
171. European Commission v. United Kingdom (C-112/14), para. 27.
172. See, inter alia, BE: ECJ, 26 Sept. 2000, Case C-478/98, Commission of the 
European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium, para. 45, ECJ Case Law 
IBFD; SIAT (C-318/10),para. 38.
173. De Broe, supra n. 89, at 238; E Traversa & A Herbain, General Assessment 
of BEPS and EU Law: Hybrid Mismatches, Interest Deductions, Abuse of 
Tax Treaties and CFC rules 306 (Schulthess 2016). 
174. Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/136 of 28 January 2016 on 
the Implementation of Measures against Tax Treaty Abuse (Notified
under Document C(2016) 271), preamble, (7), EU Law IBFD.
175. Id., at preamble, (2).
176. Id., at preamble, (7).
177. Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal
market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/
Directive 2016.178 Article 1(2) of the revised version of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, for example, provides that:
Member States shall not grant the benefits of this Directive to 
an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been 
put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes 
of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose 
of this Directive, are not genuine having regard to all relevant 
facts and circumstances. An arrangement may comprise more 
than one step or part.
In turn, article 1(3) stipulates that “an arrangement or a 
series of arrangements shall be regarded as not genuine to 
the extent that they are not put into place for valid com-
mercial reasons which ref lect economic reality”. As can 
be seen, this language, which refers to “the main purpose 
or one of the main purposes,” differs from the terminol-
ogy used by the treaty PPT rule, which uses, instead, the 
expression “one of the principal purposes”. Also on this 
point, the compatibility of the directive with EU law is 
subject to a scholarly discussion. For some commentators, 
the expression “the main purpose or one of the main pur-
poses” should receive a restrictive interpretation in the 
sense that only transactions where the sole or predom-
inant purpose is to obtain the tax benefit provided by 
the directive may be caught by its anti-abuse rule. 179 In 
essence, this reasoning relies on the case law of the ECJ 
relating to the anti-abuse rule of the Merger Directive,180 
which similarly uses the terms “principal objective or one 
of the principal objectives”. In Kofoed, the ECJ clarified 
that this language referred to “transactions carried out not 
in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely 
for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages pro-
vided for by Community law”.181 In Foggia, the ECJ used 
a slightly different terminology but nevertheless held that:
a merger operation based on several objectives, which may also 
include tax considerations, can constitute a valid commercial 
reason provided, however, that those considerations are not pre-
dominant in the context of the proposed transaction182 
and:
where the merger operation has the sole aim of obtaining a tax 
advantage and is not carried out for valid commercial reasons, 
such a finding may constitute a presumption that the operation 
has tax evasion or avoidance as one of its principal objectives.183 
EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 
2007/64/EC (Text with EEA relevance), available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015L2366 [here-
inafter: PSD Directive 2015].
178. Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 Laying down Rules 
against Tax Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning
of the Internal Market, EU Law IBFD [hereinafter: ATAD 2016].
179. F. Debelva & J. Luts,  The General Anti-Abuse Rule of the Parent-Subsid-
iary Directive, 55 Eur. Taxn 6, 225 (2015), Journals IBFD.
180. Council Directive 2009/133 EC of 19 October 2009 on the Common 
System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Partial Divisions,
Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares Concerning Companies of 
Different Member States and to the Transfer of the Registered Office of 
an SE or SCE between Member States (codified version), L 310/34/, EU 
Law IBFD [hereinafter: EU Merger Directive (2009/133)].
181. DK: ECJ, 5 July 2007, Case C-321/05, Hans Markus Kofoed v. Skatte-
ministeriet, para. 38, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
182. PT: ECJ, 10 Nov. 2011, Case C-126/10, Foggia – Sociedade Gestora de Par-
ticipações Sociais SA v. Secretário de Estado dos Assuntos Fiscais, para. 
35, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
183. Id., para. 36.
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Another author notes that a main purpose test prima 
facie deviates from the well-known notion of “wholly 
artificial arrangement”184 applied by the ECJ in the area 
of fundamental freedoms.185 At the same time, however, 
the ECJ has also acknowledged that an arrangement may 
be artificial in whole or in part.186 From this perspective, 
it is argued that the PPT rule could be reconciled with 
the EU law notion of abuse, as the latter also allows only 
part of a transaction to be regarded as artificial, the exis-
tence of business reasons for another part of the arrange-
ment being irrelevant.187 This being said, the issue to be 
settled remains the question of whether the OECD PPT 
rule introduces a lower threshold of abuse as it does not, 
unlike these European directives, include any express 
exclusion in favour of genuine activities. A literal reading 
certainly could suggest so. However, as will be shown, it 
f lows from the examples in the 2017 updated OECD Com-
mentaries that the PPT rule is in fact very much to be con-
strued as a genuine activity test.188 Finally, the impact of 
the PPT rule may also be looked at from the perspective of 
the reservation contained in article 1(4) – formerly article 
1(2) - of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. This provision 
indeed states that “[t]his Directive shall not preclude the 
application of domestic or agreement-based provisions 
required for the prevention of tax evasion, tax fraud or 
abuse”. Since article 1(4) also refers to “agreement-based 
provisions”, it is settled that the PPT rule could be applied 
by Member States, provided, however, that its application 
is in line with EU law.189 Relevant in this context, in par-
ticular, is the awaited judgment delivered by the ECJ on 
7 September 2017 in the Eqiom case (formerly Holcim).190 
The case concerned the application of the Parent-Sub-
sidiary Directive and the exemption from withholding 
tax on dividend distributions made by a French subsid-
184. See, inter alia, UK: ECJ, 12 Sept. 2006, Case C-196/04, Cadbury 
Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue, para. 51, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
185. D. Weber, The New Common Minimum Anti-Abuse Rule in the EU Par-
ent-Subsidiary Directive: Background, Impact, Applicability, Purpose and 
Effect, 110 Intertax 2 (2016).
186. UK: ECJ, 13 Mar. 2007, Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap 
Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, para. 81, ECJ Case
Law IBFD; Weber, supra n. 185.
187. Weber, supra n. 185.
188. In the same vein, Weber, supra n. 185, at 98 et seq.
189. De Broe, supra n. 89, at 244
190. FR: ECJ, 7 Sept. 2017, Case C-6/16, Eqiom SAS, formerly Holcim France 
SAS, Enka SA v. Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics, ECJ Case 
Law IBFD. See also, recently and delivered at the time this article goes to 
press, DE: ECJ, 20 Dec. 2017, joint cases C-504/16 and C-613/16, Deister 
Holding AG and Juhler A/S versus Bundeszentralamt für Steuern. In this 
case, the ECJ held that secondary and primary EU law must be inter-
preted as  precluding a Member State’s tax legislation which, where
persons have holdings in a non-resident parent company who would 
not be entitled to the refund or exemption from withholding tax if they 
received the dividends from a resident subsidiary directly, denies, pro-
vided one of the conditions set by that legislation is satisfied, relief from
tax on income from capital tax on distributions of profits to that parent 
company. Notably, the ECJ observed (para. 73) that:
The fact that the economic activity of a non-resident parent com-
pany consists in the management of its subsidiaries’ assets or that the 
income of that company results only from such management cannot 
per se indicate the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement which 
does not ref lect economic reality. In that context, the fact that the 
management of assets is not considered to constitute an economic 
activity for the purposes of value-added tax is irrelevant, since the 
tax at issue in the main proceedings and value-added tax are gov-
erned by distinct legal regimes, each pursuing difference objectives.
iary to a Luxembourg company owned by a company in 
Cyprus, which was in turn controlled by a company with 
its seat in Switzerland. At issue in the present case was a 
former provision of the French Tax Code (Code Général 
des Impôts), which provided for a reversal of the burden of 
proof in the case of dividends paid to an EU entity directly 
or indirectly controlled by residents of non-EU Member 
States. Specifically, the withholding tax exemption pro-
vided by the Directive was not available “unless that legal 
person provides proof that the principal purpose or one 
of the principal purposes of the chain of interests is not 
to take advantage of the exemption”. The ECJ assessed 
this provision both from the perspective of the reserva-
tion contained in the Directive and EU primary law. To 
begin with, the ECJ noted that the reservation in favour 
of domestic agreement-based provisions should be con-
strued restrictively.191 Accordingly, in line with the prin-
ciple of proportionality (necessity aspect) and following 
the Cadbury Schweppes case law,192 the objective of a given 
measure should only be to prevent “conduct involving the 
creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not 
ref lect economic reality, the purpose of which is unduly 
to obtain a tax advantage.193  From this perspective, the 
ECJ held that a measure, such as that at issue, which shifts 
the burden of proof to the taxpayer simply because the EU 
parent company is controlled by residents of third states, 
is disproportionate:
The imposition of a general tax measure automatically exclud-
ing certain categories of taxpayers from the tax advantage, with-
out the tax authorities being obliged to provide even prima facie 
evidence of fraud and abuse, would go further than is necessary 
for preventing fraud and abuse.194 
For the same reason, the ECJ finally held that the French 
provision entailed an unjustified restriction to freedom 
of establishment.195 
It is submitted that the findings of the ECJ in this case - 
in particular, the question of the division of the burden 
of proof – must be taken into account by Member States 
when applying the PPT rule contained in their tax treaties, 
since it constitutes an agreement-based provision under 
article 1(4) of the Directive. Moreover, the reasoning of the 
ECJ, which is founded on general and well-known prin-
ciples of EU law, is also applicable to the interpretation 
of the GAAR clause of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
4.5.  Synthesis 
The foregoing considerations allowed the author to 
demonstrate that the text of the PPT rule may be con-
strued broadly and that this provision runs the risk of 
denying treaty benefits to bona fide business transac-
tions. Furthermore, there are tensions between the literal 
wording of the OECD PPT rule and EU law. These ten-
191. Id., para. 26.
192. Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04).
193. Eqiom SAS (C-6/16), para. 30.
194. Id., para. 32. See also FR: ECJ, 8 Mar. 2017, Case C-14/16, Euro Park
Service, paras. 55 and 56, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
195. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007,
arts. 49 and 54, OJ C115 (2008), EU Law IBFD [hereinafter: “TFEU”].; 
Eqiom SAS (C-6/16), para. 52 et seq. 
47© IBFD BullETIN for INTErNATIoNAl TAxATIoN January 2018
Treaty abuse in the Post-BEPS World: analysis of the Policy Shift and Impact of the Principal Purpose Test for MnE Groups
sions concern, in particular, the interpretation of the 
notion of “principal purpose”, the division of the burden of 
proof and the absence of an express reservation in favour 
of genuine activities. 
The author will now reconsider these findings in light of 
the examples contained in the 2017 updated OECD Com-
mentaries to the PPT rule, which, in his opinion, consti-
tute binding context in the interpretative process. The 
author shows that, if these examples are relied upon, the 
application of the PPT rule in practice should not produce 
a result that is too far apart from a genuine activity test.
4.6.  The practical application of the PPT rule in the 
2017 updated OECD Commentaries
4.6.1.  In general
The examples provided in the 2017 updated OECD Com-
mentaries give nuance to the literal wording of the PPT 
rule and suggest that (i) “one of the principal purposes” is 
less far-reaching, and (ii) the rule is substance oriented.196 
Therefore, treaty benefits are generally not denied where 
genuine business activities are taking place. This conclu-
sion is supported by several passages of the 2017 updated 
OECD Commentaries. 
In relation to the first observation, example C of the 2017 
updated OECD Commentaries may be mentioned. In this 
case, a company resident in state R, active in the business of 
producing electronic devices, is considering establishing a 
manufacturing plant in a developing country in order to 
benefit from lower manufacturing costs. After a review of 
possible locations, the only jurisdiction with which state 
R has concluded a tax treaty is selected. In this partic-
ular instance, the Commentaries nevertheless note that 
“it cannot reasonably be considered that one of the prin-
cipal purposes for building the plant is to obtain treaty 
benefits”.197 Rather, “the principal purposes for making 
that investment and building the plant are related to the 
expansion of RCO’s business and the lower manufactur-
ing costs of that country”, and the fact that the choice fell 
on the only jurisdiction with which state R has concluded 
a tax treaty is simply ignored.
Second, the importance of substance and genuine activ-
ities f lows from the Commentaries on several occasions. 
To begin with, the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries 
note that:
where an arrangement is inextricably linked to a core commer-
cial activity, and its form has not been driven by considerations 
of obtaining a benefit, it is unlikely that its principal purpose 
will be considered to be to obtain that benefit.198   
More concretely, example G of the Commentaries is illus-
trative of the role of local substance. In this example, a 
group is considering establishing a regional company for 
the purpose of providing group services to these compa-
196. For a recent detailed discussion of these examples, see Chand, supra n. 
2 (forthcoming).
197. Action 6 Final Report, at 60; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 182, Example C (2017).
198. Action 6 Final Report, at 58, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 181 (2017).
nies, including management services, such as account-
ing, legal advice, human resources, financing, treasury 
services such as managing currency risks and arranging 
hedging transactions, as well as some other non-financ-
ing related services. State R is selected because of its com-
prehensive double taxation network and, in particular, 
because it has concluded tax treaties with the five juris-
dictions within which the group owns subsidiaries. In this 
example, the application of the PPT rule is denied with a 
clear emphasis on the importance of local substance to 
arrive at this result:
Assuming that the intra-group services to be provided by RCO, 
including the making of decisions necessary for the conduct 
of its business, constitute a real business through which RCO 
exercises substantive economic functions, using real assets and 
assuming real risks, and that business is carried on by RCO 
through its own personnel located in State R, it would not be 
reasonable to deny the benefits of the treaties concluded between 
State R and the five States where the subsidiaries operate unless 
other facts would indicate that RCO has been established for 
other tax purposes or unless RCO enters into specific transac-
tions to which paragraph 9 would otherwise apply....199 
A similar reasoning is followed in example K, which con-
cerns a resident company owned by an institutional inves-
tor:
The decision to establish the regional investment platform in 
State R was mainly driven by the availability of directors with 
knowledge of regional business practices and regulations, the 
existence of a skilled multilingual workforce, [...] RCO employs 
an experienced local management team to review investment 
recommendations from Fund and performs various other func-
tions which, depending on the case, may include approving 
and monitoring investments, carrying on treasury functions, 
maintaining RCO’s books and records, and ensuring compli-
ance with regulatory requirements in States where it invests.200 
It follows from the foregoing that substance is one of the 
key elements allowing the taxpayer to demonstrate that the 
subjective element of the PPT rule is not satisfied, namely 
that obtaining the relevant treaty benefit is not one of the 
principal purposes of the arrangement or transaction that 
resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit. Within the 
EU internal market, substance is, of course, linked to the 
EU notion of genuine activities. How should substance be 
construed in third-state relations? In the author’s opinion, 
it follows from the Commentaries to the PPT rule that, 
in determining whether an arrangement is “inextrica-
bly linked to a core commercial activity”, transfer pricing 
principles may serve as guidance. That is, if the entity in 
the residence state exercises and respectively bears the rel-
evant functions (for example, the “DEMPE functions” in 
the case of an IP company) and risks, it should be assumed 
that the arrangement is indeed linked to a core commer-
cial activity. A fortiori, this condition would also be satis-
fied in the case of an IP company whose income derived 
from the State of source qualifies as privileged income 
under a nexus based IP box regime within the meaning 
of BEPS Action 5. Such income would indeed undoubt-
199. Action 6 Final Report, at 62; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 182, Example G (2017).
200. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29 para. 182, Example K (2017).
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edly be linked to substantial R&D activities in the resi-
dence state.201 
4.6.2.  Conduit arrangements
Interestingly, the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries 
also focuses on substance, business rationale and com-
mercial organization when looking at the application of 
the PPT rule to possible conduit structures. From a policy 
perspective, it is interesting to observe that the examples 
illustrating the application of the PPT rule in relation to 
conduit arrangements have been directly inspired from 
those laid down in the exchange of letters to the conduit 
arrangement clause of article 3(1)(n) of the 2001 United 
States-United Kingdom tax treaty. In essence, the appli-
cation of this provision is subject to two requirements. 
That is, the existence of a conduit arrangement which, in 
essence, occurs where a resident “pays, directly or indi-
rectly, all or substantially all of that income (at any time 
or in any form) to another person who is not a resident 
of either Contracting State” and, finally, a main purpose 
test.202 During the work conducted in relation to BEPS 
Action 6, this clause was considered203 at some point but 
was ultimately not regarded as an appropriate option as 
201. This is, however, not to say that only IP income falling within the scope 
of the modified nexus approach would meet the substance test under the 
PPT rule. Such substance test indeed appears closer to a transfer pricing 
analysis, which is less restrictive than the modified nexus approach (in
particular, in outsourcing situations).
202. Specifically according to this provision, the term “conduit arrange-
ment” means a transaction or series of transactions:
i) which is structured in such a way that a resident of a Contract-
ing State entitled to the benefits of this Convention receives an item 
of income arising in the other Contracting State but that resident
pays, directly or indirectly, all or substantially all of that income (at 
any time or in any form) to another person who is not a resident of 
either Contracting State and who, if it received that item of income 
direct from the other Contracting State, would not be entitled under 
a convention for the avoidance of double taxation between the state 
in which that other person is resident and the Contracting State in 
which the income arises, or otherwise, to benefits with respect to
that item of income which are equivalent to, or more favourable than,
those available under this Convention to a resident of a Contract-
ing State; and (ii) which has as its main purpose, or one of its main 
purposes, obtaining such increased benefits as are available under 
this Convention. 
203. OECD/G20, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances – Action 6: 2014 Deliverable, OECD/G20 Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting Project (16 Sept. 2014), International Organizations’ 
Documentation IBFD.
the phrase “pays, directly or indirectly, all or substan-
tially all” was found to give rise to uncertainties.204 The 
fact remains, however, that the examples agreed between 
the US and UK competent authorities are, as shown in the 
Table, identical to the ones of the new commentaries in 
relation to conduit situations.205  
Particularly interesting in this respect is example E. In 
this example, a company resident in state R is the holding 
company for a manufacturing group in a highly compet-
itive technological field. The manufacturing group con-
ducts research in subsidiaries located around the world. 
Any patents developed in a subsidiary are licensed by that 
subsidiary to the holding company in state R, which then 
licenses the technology to other subsidiaries that need it. 
The holding company generally keeps only a small spread 
with respect to the royalties it receives, so that most of the 
profit goes to the subsidiary that incurred the risk with 
respect to the development of the technology. One sub-
sidiary of the group, a company resident in a non-treaty 
jurisdiction, happens to have developed a process that 
will, in particular, substantially increase the profitabil-
ity of another sister company located in state S. Accord-
ing to the standard practice of the group, the holding 
company thus sublicenses the technology developed by 
the company in the non-treaty jurisdiction to its subsidi-
ary in state S. The end result, therefore, is that the holding 
company is paying out to an entity located in a non-treaty 
jurisdiction substantially all of the royalties it derives from 
state S. The question thus arises as to whether, with respect 
to this particular income stream, the holding company 
could be regarded as conduit arrangement. The question 
is answered in the negative. In order to arrive at this con-
clusion, the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries note:
In this example, there is no indication that RCO established 
its licensing business in order to reduce the withholding tax 
payable in State S. Because RCO is conforming to the standard 
commercial organization and behaviour of the group in the way 
204. See Meindl-Ringler, supra n. 10, at 348 et seq.
205. Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States 
of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains 
(24 July 2001) (as amended through 2002) [hereinafter: UK-US Income
Tax Treaty].
Fact pattern 2017 OECD Commentary 
para. 187 ad art. 29 
Exhange of letters to art. 
3(1)(n) US-UK 
Conduit? 
Issuance of preferred sharesby SCO to rCO with 
corresponding contract with TCO 
Example a Example 1 yes
TCO owns rCO (manufacturing) and SCO 
(distributor)
Example B Example 2 no
Loan from TCO to SCO (interest 7%); assignment 
of note to rCO (interest 6%)
Example C Example 3 yes
acquisition funding to SCO by an unrelated bank 
(rCO); historic large deposits by TCO
Example D Example 4 no
Holding company (rCO), licensing (TCO-rCO) 
and sublicensing (rCO-SCO); small spread; group 
practice 
Example E Example 5 no
Centralized cash management (rCO) for TCO and 
subsidiaries 
Example F Example 6 no
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that it structures its licensing and sub-licensing activities and 
assuming the same structure is employed with respect to other 
subsidiaries carrying out similar activities in countries which 
have treaties which offer similar or more favourable benefits, the 
arrangement between SCO, RCO and TCO does not constitute 
a conduit arrangement.206 
In the author’s opinion, the foregoing demonstrates that 
the PPT rule is not just triggered because of the existence 
of an interdependence between two income streams (for 
example, in the case of a licensing and sublicensing situ-
ation). Rather, obtaining the relevant treaty benefit must 
also be one of the principal purposes of the arrangement 
or transaction. That is, the arrangement must typically be 
structured to eliminate the withholding tax that would 
otherwise have been paid to the state of source207 or on 
f low-through dividends.208 This distinction between the 
existence of an economic interdependence (conduit situ-
ation), on the one hand, and the subjective element of a 
PPT rule, on the other, is perfectly illustrated in article 3(1)
(n) of the 2001 United States-United Kingdom tax treaty.
From a UK perspective, it is observed that:
even though the specific fact pattern, as presented, meets the 
first part of the definition of a ‘conduit arrangement’ … on bal-
ance the conclusion would be that “the main purpose or one of 
the main purposes” of the transactions was not the obtaining of 
UK/US treaty benefits. So the structure would not constitute a 
conduit arrangement.209 
From this perspective, therefore, the approach taken 
under the PPT rule is different from the one that could 
be favoured under a broad interpretation of beneficial 
ownership – such as the one adopted, for instance, under 
Swiss case law – which only focuses on the existence of 
an interdependence between two income streams and 
tends to ignore the underlying purposes of the structure 
or arrangement.
This being said, there is one difference between the OECD 
PPT rule and the US-UK conduit arrangement clause. 
Unlike the OECD PPT rule, the US-UK clause specifi-
cally provides that it covers only situations in which one 
of the main purposes of the transaction is to increase the 
benefits under the applicable tax treaty beyond what the 
ultimate recipient would have received if he had received 
the payment directly.210 It is submitted that the same result 
may be achieved by the OECD PPT rule. First of all, the 
fact that the arrangement or transaction does not lead 
to an increase in tax treaty benefits should be taken into 
account to assess whether obtaining the benefit of the 
newly applicable tax treaty was really one of the princi-
206. Action 6 Final Report, at 67; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 187, Example E (2017).
207. See Action 6 Final Report, at 66; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 187, Examples A and C (2017).
208. See Action 6 Final Report, at 66; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 182, Example B (2017).
209. UK-US Income Tax Treaty, art. 3(1)(n), Example 5.
210. Art. 3(1)(n) UK-US Income Tax Treaty: “and who, if it received that item 
of income direct from the other Contracting State, would not be entitled 
under a convention for the avoidance of double taxation between the 
state in which that other person is resident and the Contracting State in 
which the income arises, or otherwise, to benefits with respect to that
item of income which are equivalent to, or more favourable than, those 
available under this Convention to a resident of a Contracting State”.
pal purposes of the relevant arrangement or transaction. 
Second, should this be the case and the PPT rule is found 
to be applicable, the (identical) treaty benefits originally 
available should, in any event, be granted.
4.6.3.  Importance of the OECD Commentaries to the 
PPT rule
In light of the foregoing, it is therefore fair to say that there 
is a divergence between the wording of the PPT rule and 
the examples illustrating its application in the OECD 
Commentaries. On the one hand, the literal wording of the 
PPT suggests that the rule could be given a broad meaning 
and could possibly impact transactions or arrangements 
pursuing a valid business purpose. On the other hand, 
the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries to the PPT rule 
clarify that the PPT rule is, in essence, a business reality 
test focusing on substance. In the author’s opinion, the 
2017 updated OECD Commentaries ref lect the contextual 
meaning of the PPT, and therefore states may not give to 
this new rule a meaning that exceeds the interpretation 
conveyed by BEPS Action 6. It consequently follows that 
treaty benefits should not be denied as soon as an arrange-
ment or a transaction is predominantly and “inextricably 
linked to a core commercial activity”.211 At the same time, 
however, this divergence between the literal wording of 
the PPT rule and its Commentaries is not ideal from a tax 
certainty point of view. From a corporate tax governance 
perspective, multinational enterprises will thus be well 
advised to ensure in advance and especially in the initial 
implementation phase that the scope given that may be 
given to the PPT rule by the jurisdictions in which they 
operate coincides with the OECD interpretation. 
This being said, even if the PPT is construed in accordance 
with its 2017 updated OECD Commentaries, some dif-
ficulties still remain with regard to the consequences of 
denial of treaty benefits (see section 4.7.) and the relation-
ship of the PPT rule with treaty SAARs (see section 4.8.). 
4.7.  The consequences of denial of treaty benefits 
4.7.1.  The issue 
Where the PPT rule is found to be applicable, another 
practical issue arising is the question of whether treaty 
benefits that would otherwise have been applicable in the 
absence of the problematic transaction or arrangement 
(for example, a 15% residual tax treaty rate instead of a 
0% residual rate in a rule shopping situation)212 may auto-
matically be claimed. There is a scholarly discussion on 
this point because the PPT rule simply states that, when 
it applies, treaty benefits “shall not be granted”. This 
wording could thus prima facie suggest that a return to 
“status quo” is not possible.
211. Action 6 Final Report, at p. 58, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 181 (2017).
212. De Broe, supra n. 89, at p. 217; Lang, supra n. 82, at 659.
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4.7.2.  With a discretionary relief clause 
This position seems to be confirmed by the MLI since 
the instrument includes an optional clause213 that states 
may choose to include in their CTAs if they wish to allow 
treaty benefits on the basis of the facts, as they would in the 
absence of the abusive arrangement or transaction. Pursu-
ant to this optional clause, states denying treaty benefits 
may treat the taxpayer as:
being entitled to this benefit, or to different benefits with respect 
to a specific item of income or capital, if such competent author-
ity, upon request from that person and after consideration of the 
relevant facts and circumstances, determines that such benefits 
would have been granted to that person in the absence of the 
transaction or arrangement […]. The competent authority of 
the Contracting State to which the request has been made will 
consult with the competent authority of the other State before 
rejecting a request made under this paragraph by a resident of 
that other State.214 
Under this mechanism, therefore, the question of whether 
alternative treaty benefits should be granted is left to the 
discretion of the competent authority to which the request 
is made.215  The 2017 updated OECD Commentaries note 
that this provision grants broad discretion to the com-
petent authority for the purposes of these determina-
tions.216 The application of this rule is illustrated through 
a classical rule-shopping situation. An individual who is 
a resident of state R and who owns shares in a company 
resident in state S assigns the right to receive dividends 
declared by that company to another company resident 
in state R which owns more than 10% of the capital of 
the paying company for the principal purpose of obtain-
ing the reduced rate of source taxation provided for in 
article 10(2)(a). In such a case, if it is determined that the 
benefit of article 10(2)(a) should be denied pursuant to 
the PPT rule, this discretionary relief mechanism would 
then allow the competent authority of state S to grant the 
benefit of the reduced rate of 15% provided under article 
10(2)(b) if that competent authority determined that 
such benefit would have been granted in the absence of 
the assignment to another company of the right to receive 
dividends.217 From a policy perspective, this conclusion is 
obviously correct. However, this interpretation does not 
f low clearly from the text of article 7(4) of the MLI. The 
213. Art. 7(4) MLI.
214. Art. 7(4) MLI.
215. Action 6 Final Report, at 19, 64-65; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 185 (2017).
216. Action 6 Final Report, at 19, 64-65; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 185 (2017): 
The provision does require, however, that the competent authority 
must consider the relevant facts and circumstances before reaching 
a decision and must consult the competent authority of the other 
Contracting State before rejecting a request to grant benefits if that 
request was made by a resident of that other State. The first require-
ment seeks to ensure that the competent authority will consider each 
request on its own merits whilst the requirement that the competent 
authority of the other Contracting State be consulted if the request is 
made by a resident of that other State should ensure that Contracting 
States treat similar cases in a consistent manner and can justify their 
decision on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. This consultation process does not, however, require that the 
competent authority to which the request was presented obtain the 
agreement of the competent authority that is consulted.
217. Action 6 Final Report, at 19, 64-65; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 185 (2017).
wording of this provision indeed suggests that the person 
to whom alternative treaty benefits may be granted (“treat 
that person … would have been granted to that person”) 
should be the same as the one to whom the treaty benefits 
claimed are denied pursuant to the PPT rule (“denied to 
a person”). However, as shown by the foregoing example, 
and where a recharacterization takes place, alternative 
treaty benefits are often granted by reference to another 
taxpayer (i.e. typically to the initial owner of the shares 
in an abusive restructuring). For these reasons, as will be 
suggested, a rule not referring to a specific taxpayer would 
have been preferable.
4.7.3.  Without a discretionary relief clause 
Irrespective of the foregoing, the question arises as to 
whether it may be inferred that where such an optional 
mechanism is not included into the applicable tax treaty, 
the state of source is not allowed to grant treaty benefits 
on the basis of a recharacterized fact pattern as this would 
then contravene the literal wording of the PPT rule (“shall 
not be granted”).218 In the author’s opinion, this position 
may not be supported for several reasons. First of all, the 
expression “shall not be granted” must be read in relation 
to the “principal purposes of any arrangement or trans-
action that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit”. 
Where, however, treaty benefits are granted on the basis of 
a recharacterized fact pattern (for example, a 15% residual 
tax treaty rate instead of a 0% residual rate in a rule shop-
ping situation),219 these benefits are no longer linked to 
an abusive arrangement. Therefore, the PPT rule may not 
restrict these latter benefits. In the author’s view, the object 
and purpose of the PPT does not contradict this interpre-
tation. Second, the systematic argument contending that, 
if a discretionary relief mechanism is not included into the 
tax treaty, it may then be inferred that the PPT rule pre-
vents the state of source from granting treaty benefits on 
the basis of a recharacterized fact pattern is, in the author’s 
opinion, not a valid one. Indeed, a systematic argument 
may only be put forward where one provision that is actu-
ally included into the tax treaty is used to elucidate the 
scope of another provision. Accordingly, where the dis-
cretionary relief mechanism does not form part of the rel-
evant tax treaty, the scope of the PPT rule should solely 
be determined on the basis of its literal wording, object 
and purpose and relationship with other provisions of this 
treaty. Last but not least, as the BEPS outcome expressly 
provides for the possibility of granting treaty benefits on 
the basis of the facts as they would be in the absence of an 
abuse, it must be considered that states wishing to do so 
- either on the basis of their practice or an express discre-
tionary relief mechanism – still meet the minimum stan-
dard provided by BEPS Action 6.
Based on the foregoing, the author concludes that, when 
applying a PPT rule and denying treaty benefits, a juris-
diction may still grant treaty benefits on the basis of a 
recharacterized fact pattern, even if such jurisdiction 
has reserved the right not to include the discretionary 
218. Along these lines, Moreno, supra n. 82, at 440 et seq.
219. De Broe, supra n. 89, at 217; Lang, supra n. 82, at 659.
51© IBFD BullETIN for INTErNATIoNAl TAxATIoN January 2018
Treaty abuse in the Post-BEPS World: analysis of the Policy Shift and Impact of the Principal Purpose Test for MnE Groups
.
relief mechanism provided under article 7(4) of the MLI 
in its CTAs. This would, for example, concern Switzer-
land which has reserved the right not to apply this pro-
vision but whose case law and practice regarding abusive 
restructurings (“old reserves theory”) support the grant-
ing of treaty benefits on the basis of a recharacterized fact 
pattern.220 However, from a policy and tax certainty per-
spective, the introduction of an automatic relief mecha-
nism would have been preferable to a mere discretionary 
clause.221 
4.7.4.  Suggested alternative clause
The foregoing interpretation could also be codified by a 
provision stipulating:
Where a benefit under this Convention is denied under para-
graph … , the competent authority of the Contracting State 
shall nevertheless grant the benefit or different benefits with 
respect to a specific item of income or capital which would have 
been granted in the absence of the transaction or arrangement 
referred to in paragraph …. 
This rule differs from article 7(4) of the MLI in two 
respects. First of all, the relief is automatic. For the reasons 
already explained, this result complies with the minimum 
standard of BEPS Action 6. Second, for the sake of clarity, 
a reference to a particular person is removed as the person 
by reference to whom alternative benefits are granted may 
not necessarily be the same as the one to whom treaty ben-
efits are denied pursuant to the PPT rule.
4.7.5.  Selected EU law perspective
The author finally observes that a similar question 
comes into play in relation to the GAAR clauses of the 
Parent-Subsidiary and ATAD Directives.222 While these 
clauses do not expressly deal with the consequences stem-
ming from the existence of an abuse, it has been correctly 
argued that a return to status quo would be the most desir-
able interpretation in light of the case law of the ECJ. For 
example, in the Halifax case, the ECJ held that “[i]t must 
also be borne in mind that a finding of abusive practice 
must not lead to a penalty, for which a clear and unambig-
uous legal basis would be necessary”223 and “it follows that 
220. In Switzerland, this fact pattern is tackled by the “old reserves theory”,
which in a treaty context essentially leads to the application of the (treaty 
residual) withholding tax rate on the reserves generated before the share 
transfer. See, in particular, FAT judgments of 23 Mar. 2010, A-2744/2008, 
supra n. 157, at 652 et seq., and of 31 Aug. 2016, A-5692/2015; see also, 
with further references to the Swiss administrative practice, Danon & 
Obrist, supra n. 157, at 621 et seq.; R. Danon, Cession transfrontalière de 
droits et de participations, in Evasion fiscale. Une approche théorique et 
pratique de l’Evasion fiscal 136 et seq. (Pierre-Marie Glauser ed., Schul-
thess Verlag 2010); S. Oesterhelt, Altreservenpraxis, FStR, 99 et seq.
(2017). 
221. The author understands that this was not possible due to the reluctance 
expressed by several states. However, in the internal market, the ques-
tion now arises as to whether such a discretionary mechanism could 
fall within the scope of State aid rules (art. 107 et seq. TFEU).
222. Art. 1 PSD Directive 2015 amending art. 1 (2); similarly, art. 6 ATAD 
2016; see, among others, Weber, supra n. 183, at 126; Debelva & Luts, 
supra n. 179, at 223 et seq.; L. De Broe & D. Beckers, The General Anti-
Abuse Rule of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: An Analysis Against the 
Wider Perspective of the European Court of Justice’s Case Law on Abuse
of EU Law, 133 EC Tax Rev. 3 (2017).
223. UK: ECJ, 21 Feb. 2006, Case C-255/02, Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent
Development Services Ltd, County Wide Property Investments Ltd v.
transactions involved in an abusive practice must be rede-
fined so as to re-establish the situation that would have 
prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting 
that abusive practice”.224 This reasoning was again reaf-
firmed in the Cussens case recently decided by the ECJ.225 
The interpretation advocated by this study, therefore, is 
the most compatible with EU law. 
4.8.  The relationship of the PPT rule with treaty 
SAARs
4.8.1.  Introductory remarks
One important practical issue that needs to be clarified is 
the relationship of the PPT rule with other anti-avoidance 
rules. In order to keep the discussion within manageable 
proportions, the author only discusses the relationship 
between the PPT rule and treaty SAARs. 
4.8.2.  The issue: “Notwithstanding any provisions of a 
Covered Tax Agreement”
As already discussed, the issue of the relationship between 
a GAAR – such as a PPT rule – and a SAAR is well known. 
According to the opinion favoured in this article, which is 
also endorsed by several other commentators, the problem 
should be settled by the lex specialis derogat legi generali 
principle: to the extent that the SAAR covers the factual 
situation at issue, the latter may not, in addition, be tested 
in light of a GAAR.
However, with the PPT rule, this reasoning becomes 
controversial because the rule applies “[n]otwithstand-
ing any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement”.226 De 
Broe (2008) notes that, based on its literal wording, a 
transaction or arrangement may be caught by the PPT 
rule even where the test of other, specific (treaty-based) 
anti-abuse rules has already been passed. For the author, 
however, it would be unacceptable to first include a SAAR 
in a tax treaty that specifically circumscribes the taxpayer 
behaviour which the treaty partners consider abusive on 
the basis of objectively verifiable (often quantitative, safe 
harbour) parameters, only to subsequently apply the PPT 
rule to extend the legal consequences provided therein 
to other situations beyond the scope of that SAAR. The 
author submits, however, that the principle lex specialis 
derogat legi generali continues to apply to the PPT rule. 
Accordingly, it should follow that, if a purported abusive 
arrangement could be tackled under both the PPT rule 
and a SAAR, the SAAR should generally prevail, pro-
vided that the latter covers the same situation. As will be 
Commissioners of Customs & Excise, BUPA Hospitals Ltd, Goldsborough 
Developments Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise and Univer-
sity of Huddersfield Higher Education Corporation v. Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise, para. 93, ECJ Case Law IBFD.
224. Id., para. 94.
225. IE: ECJ, 22 Nov. 2017, Case C-251/16, Edward Cussens, John Jennings, 
Vincent Kingston v. T.G. Brosman, para. 46, ECJ Case Law IBFD: “Where
an abusive practice has been found to exist, the transactions involved 
must be redefined so as to re-establish the situation that would have 
prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting that abusive 
practice. That redefinition must, however, go no further than is neces-
sary”.
226. See, in particular, Moreno, supra n. 82, at 440 et seq.; De Broe, supra n. 
89, at 221; Lang, supra n. 82, at 658.
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shown, this position, which may be supported by the 
2017 updated OECD Commentaries to the PPT rule, cor-
responds to the one the author defends. Moreno (2017) 
also generally endorses the principle of lex specialis derogat 
legi generali. However, in relation to the interpretation 
of the expression “Notwithstanding any provisions of a 
Covered Tax Agreement”, he suggests a specific inter-
pretation. That is, the provisions: to which the PPT rule 
refers would not be other SAARs but, rather, exclusively 
the distributive227 and possibly the relief rules228 whose 
application the taxpayer aims to provoke by means of an 
abusive behaviour.229 Accordingly, Moreno (2017) con-
cludes that, despite the clear statements contained in the 
2017 updated OECD Commentaries, the PPT rule should 
be just applicable to arrangements leading to rule shop-
ping, whereas treaty-shopping strategies should be con-
sidered to be covered comprehensively by the LOB clauses. 
For Moreno (2017), this approach would, in particular, 
be consistent with the wording of the PPT rule.230 In the 
author’s opinion, this position may not be supported for 
several reasons. First, there is nothing in the wording of 
the PPT rule that could suggest that it would only cover 
rule shopping and other abusive restructuring cases. This 
interpretation could possibly be argued if, by contrast, the 
PPT rule had contained wording referring to a transac-
tion “arranged or maintained”. However, the PPT rule is 
broader and refers, instead, simply to “one of the principal 
purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted 
directly or indirectly in that benefit”. Second, as the author 
acknowledges, this interpretation is not at all supported 
by the Commentaries to the PPT which clearly state that 
the PPT is meant to cover conduit situations which are 
not addressed by LOB clauses.231 In light of the fact that 
the 2017 Commentaries to the PPT rule are clearly of con-
textual relevance as regards its interpretation, this posi-
tion is thus not sustainable also for this reason. Finally, 
the author observes that limiting the scope of application 
of the PPT to rule shopping cases is difficult to reconcile 
with the interpretation of beneficial ownership under the 
2014 OECD Commentaries. Under these Commentaries, 
beneficial ownership is to receive a narrow meaning which 
entails that it cannot cover more sophisticated conduit 
arrangements. Accordingly, if the PPT rule were not to be 
applicable to these conduit situations, the latter would not 
be addressed by any treaty anti-avoidance rule. 
In order to decide whether the PPT rule should apply, the 
only question which must be answered is whether any 
applicable SAAR covers the factual situation at issue. For 
that purpose, an essential issue which needs to be settled 
is the exact delineation of the scope of the SAAR, which 
is a matter of interpretation that must be analysed pursu-
ant to article 31 et seq. of the VCLT. 
It is submitted that the 2017 Commentaries clarify the 
relationship of the PPT rule with treaty SAARs in a way 
227. OECD Model: Commentary on Articles 6-22 (2017).
228. OECD Model: Commentary on Article 23 A and B (2017).
229. Moreno, supra n. 82, at 441.
230. Id.
231. Action 6 Final Report, at 59-60; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 182 (2017).
that corresponds to the foregoing interpretation. In the 
author’s opinion, this interpretation stems from para-
graphs 171 and 173 of the 2017 Commentaries to article 
29(9) of the OECD Model. 
First of all, paragraph 171 stipulates that a benefit that 
is denied in accordance with an LOB provision is not a 
benefit to which the PPT rule would also apply.232 It may 
thus be inferred from this passage that the PPT rule does 
not cover a factual situation, which an LOB clause would 
address as a lex specialis. 233 
Paragraph 173, on the other hand, concerns a situation 
in which a public company would be regarded as a qual-
ified person under an LOB clause, but would enter into 
a conduit arrangement with respect to certain items of 
income. Here the 2017 updated OECD Commentaries 
state:
As long as that company is a “qualified person” […], it is clear 
that the benefits of the Convention should not be denied solely 
on the basis of the ownership structure of that company, e.g. 
because a majority of the shareholders in that company are not 
residents of the same State.234 
Furthermore, the object and purpose of an LOB clause is 
to establish a threshold for the treaty entitlement of public 
companies whose shares are held by residents of different 
states. The Commentaries then go on to say:
The fact that such a company is a qualified person does not 
mean, however, that benefits could not be denied under para-
graph 9 for reasons that are unrelated to the ownership of the 
shares of that company. Assume, for instance, that such a public 
company is a bank that enters into a conduit financing arrange-
ment intended to provide indirectly to a resident of a third State 
the benefit of lower source taxation under a tax treaty. In that 
case, paragraph 9 would apply to deny that benefit because sub-
paragraph c) of paragraph 2, when read in the context of the rest 
of the Convention and, in particular, its preamble, cannot be 
considered as having the purpose, shared by the two Contract-
ing States, of authorising treaty-shopping transactions entered 
into by public companies.235 
In the author’s opinion, paragraph 173 may be con-
strued as meaning that the PPT rule remains applicable 
to the factual elements that are not covered by the rel-
evant SAAR.236 As already mentioned, this requires the 
scope of the SAAR to be determined on the basis of its 
interpretation. Since, in this particular example, the LOB 
clause covers the factual elements relating to the owner-
ship structure of the company, these elements may not 
be reviewed in light of the PPT rule. By contrast, the fact 
that this company also enters into a conduit arrangement 
is a factual element that is not related to the ownership 
structure of this company. Therefore, to the extent that 
this second and distinct factual element is not addressed 
by the applicable SAAR, the PPT applies to it by default. 
232. Action 6 Final Report, at 59-60; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 171 (2017).
233. In the same vein, see Moreno, supra n. 82, at 440. 
234. Action 6 Final Report, at 59-60; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 173 (2017).
235. Id.
236. In the same vein, see Moreno, supra n. 82, at 441. 
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4.8.3.  Position: Treaty SAAR solely applies if it covers the 
same facts
In light of the foregoing, and taking into account the 
updated Commentaries, the author argues that the expres-
sion “Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax 
Agreement” should not be interpreted to mean that the 
PPT rule applies, in addition, to factual elements that are 
already covered by a treaty SAAR. Rather, in such a case, 
and as regards these factual elements only, the SAAR is, 
in the author’s opinion, solely applicable. 
The Commentaries address the relationship between the 
PPT rule and an LOB clause. It is, however, submitted 
that the same reasoning applies to other treaty SAARs, 
in particular those which are recommended by the work 
on BEPS Action 6, namely the clauses relating to dividend 
transfer transactions237 and to capital gains relating to real 
estate companies.238 From a policy perspective, this inter-
pretation also contributes to tax certainty in the sense that 
a fact pattern which is objectively and specifically covered 
by a SAAR may not, as a second step, be tested in light of 
the PPT rule. This position is, in fact, even more justified 
as regards the BEPS SAARs since the latter and the PPT 
rule are rooted in the work relating to BEPS Action 6 and 
were elaborated at the same time. 
It consequently follows that the expression “Notwithstand-
ing any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement” used by the 
PPT rule refers to factual situations that are not covered 
by a treaty SAAR. 
4.8.4.  Particular case of beneficial ownership
4.8.4.1.  Introductory remarks 
The relationship between the PPT rule and beneficial 
ownership deserves special attention. Despite the exis-
tence and evolution of the OECD Commentary, the 
meaning given to beneficial ownership around the globe 
is far from being uniform with, in essence, some jurisdic-
tions adopting a rather formal and legal interpretation and 
others favouring, by contrast, a broader substance-over-
form approach. Hence, the scope of beneficial ownership 
as a SAAR may vary depending on the meaning it receives, 
which, according to the foregoing interpretation, could in 
turn affect the scope of application of the PPT rule. 
Therefore, in order to keep the discussion within manage-
able proportions, the author here considers two situations, 
namely the case in which beneficial ownership receives 
the meaning it has under the 2014 OECD Commentaries 
(narrow interpretation, see section 4.8.4.2.) and the case 
in which it is, by contrast, defined according to an objec-
tive substance-over-form approach.239 
237. Art. 8 MLI.
238. Art. 9 MLI.
239. See sec. 4.8.4.3.
4.8.4.2.  Analysis under the narrow meaning of the 2014 
Commentaries 
As previously mentioned, the 2014 OECD Commentaries 
have reduced the beneficial ownership threshold so that 
this requirement is to be construed in a narrow way and, 
thus, is of very limited use in conduit situations. The fact 
that the final report on BEPS Action 6 does not at all rely 
on beneficial ownership to address conduit cases, plus the 
fact that these situations should be tackled either by the 
PPT rule or through specific conduit rules producing the 
same effect, confirm this interpretation.
Therefore, where beneficial ownership receives the 
meaning it has under the 2014 OECD Commentaries, 
the relationship of the PPT rule with beneficial owner-
ship is easy to settle: in the case of dividends, interest and 
royalties, the PPT would, in particular, apply where (i) the 
conduit situation is not covered by beneficial ownership 
(due to its narrow meaning), or (ii) the factual situation at 
issue is not one with which beneficial ownership is at all 
concerned, such as an abusive restructuring. This inter-
pretation also f lows from the 2017 updated OECD Com-
mentaries to the PPT, which state that the rule would in 
particular apply to:
limitations on the taxing rights of a Contracting State in respect 
of dividends, interest or royalties arising in that State, and paid 
to a resident of the other State (who is the beneficial owner) 
under Article 10, 11 or 12.240 
4.8.4.3.  Analysis under a broad substance and objective 
oriented meaning 
Slightly more delicate, by contrast, is the case in which 
the state of source favours a broad and objective meaning 
of beneficial ownership (departing from the 2014 OECD 
Commentaries), such as in Switzerland. In essence, the 
two foregoing situations should here, again, be distin-
guished. 
The first situation, and the easier to resolve, is the case in 
which treaty abuse is rooted in an abusive restructuring. 
In this first instance, it is quite clear that the PPT rule 
would be solely applicable because beneficial ownership, 
even construed broadly, is a test that focuses exclusively 
on the intensity of the ownership attributes of the recipi-
ent, or on the interdependence between the items received 
and transferred by the recipient in the state of residence. 
The second situation, on the other hand, is more compli-
cated. Indeed, if beneficial ownership is construed broadly 
and is capable of covering most conduit situations, it is 
then prima facie arguable that these situations should 
be exclusively tackled through the beneficial ownership 
requirement by virtue of the lex specialis derogat legi gen-
erali principle. The question may then be asked whether 
beneficial ownership would produce the same result as the 
PPT rule. In the author’s opinion, this would not always 
be the case. In Switzerland, for example, the focus is on 
the criterion of interdependence between the income and 
240. Action 6 Final Report, at 65-66; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 175.
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the obligation to transfer such income to non-residents. 
However, as previously shown, the intention and motives 
that have led the taxpayer to select a particular arrange-
ment or structure are irrelevant. By contrast, the PPT 
rule is based on a different policy in which the purpose 
and business rationale of the transaction are taken into 
account. The PPT rule will thus not simply apply because 
there is some sort of interdependence between the two 
income streams but, rather, because the purpose of the 
transaction was to eliminate withholding tax in the source 
state. Hence, by mirrored reasoning, the PPT rule will not 
apply where, despite the existence of some sort of interde-
pendence, the transaction is, for example, “conforming to 
the standard commercial organisation and behaviour of 
the group”.241 Consequently, it follows that there may be 
instances in which treaty benefits could be denied on the 
basis of an objective and broad interpretation of benefi-
cial ownership, whereas this would not have been the case 
under the PPT rule if it had applied in lieu of this broadly 
construed SAAR. 
Is the foregoing result in line with the BEPS outcome? At 
first sight, the question could be answered in the affir-
mative using the argument that the introduction of the 
PPT rule merely constitutes a minimum standard and 
that states are free to adopt stricter measures or prac-
tices and judicial doctrines to counter treaty abuse (such 
241. Action 6 Final Report, at 67; OECD Model: Commentary on Article 29
para. 187, Example E (2017).
as a broad interpretation of beneficial ownership). In the 
author’s opinion, this interpretation may, however, not 
be supported. First of all, the outcome of BEPS Action 
6 expresses a consensus as regards the way to address 
conduit situations (through a PPT rule). This consensus 
around this policy is so strong that, if states wish to opt out 
of the PPT rule, they must then adopt anti-conduit mech-
anisms that “achieve a similar result”.242  It would therefore 
be at odds with these principles if states adopting the PPT 
rule could nevertheless continue to address conduit struc-
tures on the basis of principles based on a different policy. 
4.8.4.4.  Position: Meaning of beneficial ownership must be 
aligned with the 2014 OECD Commentaries and 
BEPS policy
In light of the foregoing, the author concludes that the 
BEPS outcome implies that conduit structures must now 
be tackled on the basis of a PPT rule (or a mechanism 
based on a similar policy) and that this outcome is yet 
another reason militating in favour of an alignment of 
beneficial ownership with the narrow meaning given to 
this term under the 2014 Commentaries. From this per-
spective, therefore, the position of states favouring a broad 
substance-oriented meaning of beneficial ownership 
coupled with the lack of a purpose test should be revisited. 
242. Action 6 Final Report, at 65-66; OECD Model: Commentary on Article
29 para. 187 (2017).
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